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How strong are strategic complementarities in price setting across rms? In this paper, we pro-
vide a direct empirical estimate of rms’ price responses to changes in competitor prices. We de-
velop a general theoretical framework and an empirical identication strategy, taking advantage of
a new micro-level dataset for the Belgian manufacturing sector. We nd strong evidence of strategic
complementarities, with a typical rm adjusting its price with an elasticity of 0.4 in response to its
competitors’ price changes and with an elasticity of 0.6 in response to its own cost shocks. Further-
more, we nd evidence of substantial heterogeneity in these elasticities across rms. Small rms
exhibit no strategic complementarities in price setting and complete cost pass-through. In con-
trast, large rms exhibit strong strategic complementarities, responding to both competitor price
changes and their own cost shocks with roughly equal elasticities of around 0.5. We show that this
pattern of heterogeneity in markup variability across rms is important for explaining the aggre-
gate markup response to international shocks and the observed low exchange rate pass-through
into domestic prices.
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1 Introduction
How strong are strategic complementarities in price setting across rms? Do rms mostly adjust their
prices in response to changes in their own costs, or do they put a signicant weight on the prices set
by their competitors? The answers to these questions are central for understanding the transmission
of shocks through the price mechanism, and in particular the transmission of international shocks
such as exchange rate movements across borders.
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A long-standing classical question in international
macroeconomics, dating back at least to Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987), is how international
shocks aect domestic prices. Although these questions are at the heart of international economics,
and much progress has been made in the literature, the answers have nonetheless remained unclear
because of the complexity of empirically separating the movements in marginal costs from markups.
In this paper, we construct a new micro-level dataset for Belgium containing the necessary infor-
mation on rms’ domestic prices, their marginal costs and their competitors’ prices, in order to directly
estimate the strength of strategic complementarities across a broad range of manufacturing industries.
We develop a general theoretical framework that allows us to empirically decompose the rm’s price
change into a response to movements in its own marginal cost (the own cost pass-through) and a re-
sponse to its competitors’ price changes (the strategic complementarity elasticity). An important feature
of our theoretical framework is that it does not require us to commit to a specic model of demand,
market structure, price setting, or production to obtain our elasticity estimates.
Within this general framework, we develop an identication strategy to deal with three major
empirical challenges: (i) endogeneity of the competitor prices, which are determined simultaneously
with the price of the rm in the equilibrium of the price-setting game; (ii) measurement error in the
marginal cost of the rm; and (iii) correlated demand and cost shocks. We exploit the rare features of
our dataset to construct instrumental variables to address these issues. In particular, our data provide
information on the domestic market prices set by the rm and all of its competitors (both domestic and
foreign), as well as the prices of all of the rm’s imported intermediate inputs. We use these highly
disaggregated unit values of imported inputs to construct instruments for the rm’s cost shocks, and
we construct instruments for the prices of its competitors using proxies for their marginal costs. The
identication strategy exploits the idiosyncratic variation in rms’ marginal costs, which arises as rms,
even within the same industry, source their intermediate inputs from dierent countries and suppliers.
Our results provide strong evidence of strategic complementarities. We estimate that, on average,
a domestic rm changes its price in response to its competitors’ price changes with an elasticity of
about 0.4. In other words, when the rm’s competitors raise their prices by 10%, the rm increases its
own price by 4% in the absence of any movement in its marginal cost, which entirely translates into
an increase in its markup. At the same time, the elasticity of the rm’s price with respect to its own
marginal cost, holding constant the prices of its competitors, is on average about 0.6, corresponding to a
60% cost pass-through. These estimates stand in sharp contrast with the implications of the workhorse
model in international economics, which features CES demand and monopolistic competition and im-
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In macroeconomics, the presence of strategic complementarities in price setting creates additional persistence in response
to monetary shocks in models of staggered price adjustment (see e.g. Kimball 1995, and the literature that followed).
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plies constant markups, a complete (100%) cost pass-through and no strategic complementarities in
price setting. However, models that relax either of those assumptions (i.e., the assumption of monop-
olistic competition or of CES demand) are consistent with our ndings, predicting both a positive re-
sponse to competitor prices and incomplete cost pass-through. In our estimation, we cannot reject that
the two elasticities sum to one, conrming a restriction imposed by an important class of conventional
demand models.
Interestingly, we nd substantial heterogeneity in the elasticities across rms. Small rms exhibit
no strategic complementarities in price setting, and fully pass through their marginal cost shocks into
their domestic prices. The behavior of these small rms is well approximated by constant-markup
pricing, in line with a standard model of monopolistic competition under CES demand. In contrast,
large rms exhibit strong strategic complementarities and incomplete pass-through of own marginal
cost shocks. Specically, we estimate their own cost pass-through elasticity to be slightly below 0.5,
and the elasticity of their prices with respect to the prices of their competitors to be slightly above 0.5.
These large rms, though few in number, account for the majority of sales, and therefore shape the
average elasticities in the data.
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We use these estimated markup elasticities to study the transmission of an international shock,
namely an exchange rate depreciation, to aggregate sectoral-level domestic prices. We nd that the
presence of strategic complementarities and markup variability at the micro level does not necessarily
translate into aggregate markup adjustment. We show that it is necessary to have heterogeneity in both
the cost shocks and markup elasticities in order for aggregate markups to adjust. When cost shocks
are the same for all rms, the equilibrium xed point features complete pass-through, no change in
relative prices across rms, and hence no markup adjustment. Interestingly, even when cost shocks
are heterogeneous, resulting in some rms increasing their markups and other rms decreasing them,
these markup adjustments net out exactly if all rms share the same markup elasticity and exhibit the
same degree of strategic complementarities. Consequently, the aggregate markup remains unchanged,
despite markup adjustment by individual rms, and the aggregate pass-through of shocks is complete.
3
Thus, we show it is the interaction between the heterogeneity in strategic complementarities and cost
shocks across rms that is necessary for aggregate markup adjustment.
We nd that the presence of rm-level heterogeneity in strategic complementarities plays an im-
portant role in helping to explain the low exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices emphasized
in the empirical literature. Indeed, it is specically the type of heterogeneity that we document in the
data — with larger rms exhibiting both greater markup variability and higher import intensity — that
results in aggregate markup adjustment in response to international shocks. Because the large rms
are the ones most aected by the shock, they adjust their markups such that the cost shocks are only
2
According to our baseline denition, a large rm employs at least 100 workers (FTE), which roughly corresponds to rms
with at least a 2% market share (or also in the top 20% of the sales distribution) within their industries. Such rms account
for over 60% of total manufacturing sales. The eects we estimate are robust to dierent cutos used to dene large rms.
3
To gain intuition for this, perhaps surprising, result consider a cost shock to a subset of rms triggering their direct
pass-through response, which is in general incomplete. This initial eect, however, then induces additional indirect price
adjustments by all rms — whether aected directly by the shock or not — driven by strategic complementarities. When the
own cost pass-through elasticity and the strategic complementarity elasticity sum to one and are the same across all rms,
the direct and the indirect eects cumulate to ensure complete pass-through in the aggregate.
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partially passed through into prices. And since the small rms have low exposure to the shock and
almost no strategic complementarities, this set of rms does not suciently increase markups to oset
the large rms’ adjustment. Hence, the reduction in the large rms’ markups translates into a reduction
in the aggregate markup, attenuating the exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices. We further
show the quantitative relevance of this mechanism using a calibrated industry equilibrium model dis-
ciplined with our empirical estimates.
4
The structural model also enables us to explore the response in
counterfactual industries that may be more typical in other countries. Interestingly, we nd that the
channel through which foreign value added reaches the home market is important for the aggregate
exchange rate pass-through in the industry. In particular, aggregate markups fall by a larger amount in
industries with more import-intensive large domestic rms and less direct foreign competition in the
output market.
Our paper is the rst to provide direct evidence on the extent of strategic complementarities in price
setting across a broad range of industries. It builds on the literature that has estimated pass-through
and markup variability in specic industries such as cars (Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter 1996), coee
(Nakamura and Zerom 2010), and beer (Goldberg and Hellerstein 2013). By looking across a broad
range of industries, we explore the importance of strategic complementarities at the macro level for
the pass-through of exchange rates into aggregate producer prices. The industry studies typically rely
on structural estimation by adopting a specic model of demand and market structure, which is tailored
to the industry in question.
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In contrast, for our estimation we adopt a general theoretical framework,
with an identication strategy that relies on instrumental variables, providing direct evidence on the
importance of strategic complementarities in a broad class of price setting models.
The few studies that have focused on the pass-through of exchange rate shocks into domestic
consumer and producer prices have mostly relied on aggregate industry-level data (see, e.g. Goldberg
and Campa 2010). The more disaggregated empirical studies that use product-level prices (Auer and
Schoenle 2016, Cao, Dong, and Tomlin 2012, Pennings 2017) have typically not been able to match
the product-level price data with rm characteristics, prices of local competitors, or measures of rm
marginal costs, all of which play a central role in our identication. Without data on rm marginal
costs, correlated cost shocks may be misconstrued for strategic complementarities in price setting, as
discussed in Gopinath and Itskhoki (2011).
6
Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) emphasize that large rms exhibit lower exchange rate pass-
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For this exercise, we adopt the Atkeson and Burstein (2008) model of variable markups, which we show captures accu-
rately the extent of strategic complementarities for both small and large rms that we nd in the data. We further ensure
that the model matches the market share and import intensity distributions across rms in Belgian manufacturing.
5
A survey by De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) contrasts these studies with an alternative approach for recovering markups
based on production function estimation, which was originally proposed by Hall (1986) and developed by De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012). Our identication strategy, which relies on the direct measurement (of a portion) of the marginal cost
and does not involve a production function estimation, constitutes a third alternative for recovering information about the
markups of the rms. If we observed the full marginal cost, we could calculate markups directly by subtracting it from prices.
Since we have an accurate measure of only a portion of the marginal cost, we identify only certain properties of the rm’s
markup, such as its elasticities. Nonetheless, with enough observations, one can use our method to reconstruct the entire
markup function for the rms.
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Gopinath and Itskhoki (2011) and Burstein and Gopinath (2014) survey a broader pricing-to-market (PTM) literature,
which documents that rms charge dierent prices in dierent destinations, and actively use markups to smooth the eects
of exchange rate shocks across markets (in particular, Fitzgerald and Haller 2014 oer a direct empirical test).
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through into export prices relative to small rms. Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) demonstrate
the importance of imported intermediate inputs, in addition to variable markups, in explaining the
lower exchange rate pass-through into export prices for large rms. While these elasticities are in-
formative, the pass-through into export prices is only one component of the overall pass-through into
domestic prices of the destination countries. The other component, namely domestic prices of the do-
mestic producers, are also aected by the exchange rate both directly through the cost of their imported
inputs and indirectly due to strategic complementarities with the competing foreign rms. These over-
all eects are the focus of our current paper. Further, both of the papers on export prices estimate
reduced-form equilibrium relationships between export price pass-through and rm size in the cross-
section of rms, which are not suitable for counterfactual analysis.
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In contrast, this paper adopts an
instrumental-variable strategy to estimate structural markup elasticities, which are then suitable for
counterfactual analysis of the markup responses to various shocks.
Our framework applies more broadly beyond the study of counterfactual exchange rate shocks
because our elasticity estimates do not rely on projections of rm prices on exchange rates, as is con-
ventionally done in the pass-through literature. Our structural estimates of markup elasticities can also
be used to explore other international shocks such as trade reforms and commodity price movements.
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The literature on the eects of tari liberalization on domestic prices has mostly focused on develop-
ing countries, where big changes in taris have occurred in the recent past. For example, De Loecker,
Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016) analyze the Indian trade liberalization and Edmond, Midri-
gan, and Xu (2015) study a counterfactual trade liberalization in Taiwan; both studies nd evidence
of aggregate markup adjustment. These studies take advantage of detailed rm-product-level data, but
neither has matched import data, which constitutes the key input in our analysis, enabling us to directly
measure the component of the rm marginal cost that is most directly aected by international shocks.
Lastly, our theoretical result on (the lack of) the aggregate markup adjustment is related to the
recent papers by Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodríguez-Clare (2019; henceforth ACDR) and
Feenstra (2018). In contrast with these papers, however, our focus is on the medium-run industry
equilibrium (without entry and exit), yet we do not impose any restrictions on the class of the demand
models or the productivity distribution across rms, and importantly we allow for arbitrary patterns
in the use of imported inputs across rms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set out the theoretical framework to
guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data and presents the empirical results. Section 4
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The unavailability of comprehensive measures of competitor prices and market shares in the domestic market prevented
these studies from providing direct estimates of strategic complementarities. For example, Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014)
use industry-destination-time xed eects to absorb the competitor prices.
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The strategic complementarity elasticity also plays an important role in the New Keynesian literature, as it directly aects
the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (e.g., see Klenow and Willis 2016, Gopinath and Itskhoki 2011); our estimates can
be used as a direct input in these studies. Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) and Berger and Vavra (2019) emphasize the relationship
between the strength of strategic complementarities and the frequency of price adjustment in the menu cost models; our study
links heterogeneity in strategic complementarities to specic rm characteristics. A number of recent studies have used our
estimates of strategic complementarities: to explain the lack of the aggregate stimulus from the Japanese QE policy in 2012-14
(Rodnyansky 2018); to reproduce the exchange rate disconnect behavior in an equilibrium model (Itskhoki and Mukhin 2017);
to explain the dynamic behavior of exchange rate pass-through over the medium and the long run (Casas, Díez, Gopinath,
and Gourinchas 2016); and to study the emergence of the dollar as a vehicle currency in general equilibrium (Mukhin 2017).
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applies the general framework with our empirical estimates of markup elasticities to analyze the eect
of an exchange rate depreciation on aggregate domestic prices. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section lays out the theoretical framework for the empirical estimation of the strength of strategic
complementarities in price setting in Section 3 and the quantitative analysis in Section 4.
Price setting and the markup function We start with an accounting identity for the log price of
rm i in period t, which equals the sum of the rm’s log marginal cost mcit and log markup µit:
pit ≡ mcit + µit, (1)
where our convention is to use small letters for logs. This identity can also be viewed as the denition
of a rm’s realized log markup, whether or not it is chosen optimally by the rm and independently
of the details of the equilibrium environment. Since datasets with precisely measured rm marginal
costs are usually unavailable, equation (1) cannot be directly implemented empirically to recover rm
markups. Instead, in what follows we impose the minimum structure on the equilibrium environment
that is necessary to convert the price identity (1) into a decomposition of price changes, which can be
estimated in the data to recover important properties of the rm’s markup.
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We focus on a given industry s with N competing rms, denoted with i ∈ {1, .., N}, where N
may be nite or innite. We omit the industry identier when it causes no confusion. Our analysis is
at the level of the rm-product, and for now we abstract from the issue of multi-product rms, which
we address in Section 3.4. We denote with pt ≡ (p1t, .., pNt) the vector of prices of all N rms in the
industry, and with p−it ≡ {pjt}j 6=i the vector of prices of all (N−1) rm i’s competitors, and we make
use of the notational convention pt ≡ (pit,p−it).
We consider an arbitrary invertible demand system qit = qi(pt; ξt) for i ∈ {1, .., N}, which consti-
tutes a one-to-one mapping between any vector of prices pt and a corresponding vector of quantities
demanded qt ≡ (q1t, .., qNt), given the vector of demand shifters ξt = (ξ1t, .., ξNt). The demand
shifters summarize all variables that move the quantity demanded for a given price vector. Demand
invertibility is a mild technical requirement, which allows us to fully characterize the market outcome
in terms of a vector of prices, with a unique corresponding vector of quantities.
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The invertibility
assumption rules out the case of perfect substitutes, where multiple allocations of quantities across
rms are consistent with the same common price, yet it allows for an arbitrarily large but nite elas-
ticity of substitution, which approximates well the case of perfect substitutes (see Kucheryavyy 2012).
Importantly, this assumption does not rule out commonly used demand systems such as CES (as in
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An alternative approach in the Industrial Organization literature imposes specic demand and market structure in a given
industry to back out the implied optimal markups of the rms, and then uses identity (1) to calculate the marginal costs.
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Global demand invertibility (one-to-one mapping between pt and qt) is only needed to accommodate the case of
oligopolistic competition in quantities (Cournot-Nash) using the general notation in the space of prices. For our empiri-
cal implementation, which relies on local variation, we only require local invertibility, i.e. a full rank of the Jacobian matrix
for the demand system evaluated at the equilibrium price vector.
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Atkeson and Burstein 2008), linear (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008), Kimball (Gopinath and Itskhoki 2010),
translog (Feenstra and Weinstein 2017) and discrete-choice logit (Goldberg 1995), as well as the general
non-homothetic demand system considered by ACDR.
We allow for a range of commonly used market competition structures such as monopolistic com-
petition (asN becomes unboundedly large or as rms do not internalize their eect on aggregate prices)
and oligopolistic competition (for any nite N ) in both prices and quantities. Formally, the results be-
low accommodate all full-information simultaneous-move price-setting games, and can be immediately
extended to some sequential-move price-setting games, such as Stackelberg equilibrium. This assump-
tion excludes incomplete-information and/or dynamic price-setting considerations, such as menu costs
(e.g. Gopinath and Itskhoki 2010) or inventory management (e.g. Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan
2010), which could also be incorporated in our analysis as we discuss in Section 3.4.
Under these mild assumptions on demand and market structure, we prove the existence of a markup
function, which characterizes the rm’s optimal price-setting strategy in a given industry equilibrium
environment:
Proposition 1 For any given invertible demand system and competition structure, there exists a markup
function µit =Mi(pit,p−it; ξt), such that the rm’s static prot-maximizing price p̃it is the solution to
the following xed point equation, for any given price vector of the competitors p−it:





We provide the proof in Appendix C and oer here a brief discussion. The markup function charac-
terizes the rm’s optimal markup, µit =Mi(pit,p−it; ξt), which depends on the rm’s own price and
its competitor prices. As such, the rm’s optimal price p̃it is a solution to the xed point equation (2).
Proposition 1 does not require that competitor prices are equilibrium outcomes, as equation (2) holds
for any possible vector p−it, and corresponds to the rm’s best response schedule (or reaction func-
tion).11 Hence, equation (2) characterizes both the on- and o-equilibrium behavior of the rm given
its competitors’ prices. The full industry equilibrium is achieved when equation (2) holds for every
rm i ∈ {1, .., N} in the industry, that is all rms are on their best response schedules.
Why does the markup function depend on the price vector, and in particular on the rm’s own
price? Consider the familiar expression for the prot-maximizing log markup of a monopolistically
competitive rm, µit = log
σit
σit−1 , where σit is the elasticity of the rm’s residual demand. In general, a
change in any rm’s price pjt aects the demand for all rms in the industry, shifting the allocation to a
new point on the demand surface with dierent values of demand elasticities σit for i = 1, .., N . There-
fore, optimal markups change for all rms (with the exception of the special case of constant-elasticity
demand). This characterization of the optimal markup generalizes beyond the case of monopolistic
competition, and also applies in models with oligopolistic competition, in which case σit is the per-
11
Formally, (2) is the result of the rst-order optimality for the rm given the actions of its competitors, and hence must
hold at any regular equilibrium point. When the competition is oligopolistic in prices, (2) is formally the reaction function.
When competition is monopolistic, there is no strategic motive in price setting, and (2) simply corresponds to the rst-order
condition of rm prot maximization. When the competition is oligopolistic in quantities, the best response schedule is
formally dened in the quantity space, and (2) is its mapping into the price space.
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ceived demand elasticity for rm i, and it depends on both the curvature of demand and the conjectured
equilibrium behavior of the competitors, as we describe in Appendix C.
Price change decomposition To derive the estimating equation, we totally dierentiate the best
response condition (2) around some admissible point (p̃it,p−it; ξt), e.g. any equilibrium point (pit; ξt).
We obtain the following decomposition for the rm’s log price dierential:














The markup functionMi(·) can be evaluated for an arbitrary price vector pt = (pit,p−it), and there-
fore (3) characterizes all possible perturbations to the rm’s price in response to shocks to its marginal
cost dmcit, the prices of its competitors {dpjt}j 6=i, and the demand shifters {dξjt}Nj=1. Note that the
change in the rm’s optimal price does not directly depend on the shocks to its competitors’ marginal
costs since changes in competitors’ prices provide a sucient statistic, as follows from Proposition 1.







dp−it + εit, (4)





dξjt is rm i’s eective demand shock. In (4), we










for the own and (cumulative) competitor markup elasticities, respectively, measuring the slope of the
optimal markup functionMi(·). The own markup elasticity Γit is dened with a negative sign, as many




Intuitively, a higher price may shift the rm towards a more elastic portion of demand (e.g., as with
Kimball demand) and/or reduce its market share (in oligopolistic competition models), both of which
result in a lower optimal markup (see Appendix D). In contrast, the markup elasticity with respect
to competitor prices is typically non-negative and, when positive, it reects the presence of strategic
complementarities in price setting. Nevertheless, we do not impose any sign restrictions on Γit and Γ−it
in our empirical analysis.




ωijtdpjt, where ωijt ≡
∂Mi(pt; ξt)/∂pjt∑
k 6=i ∂Mi(pt; ξt)/∂pkt
. (6)
This implies that, independently of the demand and competition structure, there exists a theoretically
well-dened index of competitor price changes, even when the model of demand does not admit a well-
dened ideal price index (e.g., under non-homothetic demand). The index of competitor price changes
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dp−it aggregates the individual price changes across all of the rm’s competitors, dpjt for j 6= i, using
endogenous (rm-state-specic) weights ωijt, which are dened to sum to one. These weights depend
on the relative markup elasticities: the larger is rm i’s markup elasticity with respect to the price
change of rm j, the greater is the weight of rm j in the competitor price index for rm i.
Equation (4) is a generalization of the accounting framework for price changes developed by Gopinath,
Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010) and used in Burstein and Gopinath (2014). It decomposes rm i’s price
change dpit into responses to its own cost shock dmcit, to its competitor’s price changes dp−it, and to








characterizing the slope of the rm’s best response schedule, dened implicitly by (2). The coecientαit
measures the own (or idiosyncratic) cost pass-through of the rm, i.e. the elasticity of the rm’s price
with respect to its marginal cost, holding constant the prices of its competitors. The coecient γit
measures the strength of strategic complementarities in price setting, as it is the elasticity of the rm’s
price with respect to the prices of its competitors.
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The coecients αit and γit are shaped by the
markup elasticities Γit and Γ−it: a higher own-markup elasticity reduces the own cost pass-through,
as markups are more accommodative of shocks, while a higher competitor markup elasticity increases
the strategic complementarities elasticity.
In order to empirically estimate the coecients in the theoretical price decomposition (4), we need
to measure the competitor price index (6). We now provide conditions under which the weights in (6)
can be easily measured in the data, as well as a way to test these conditions empirically. Let zt denote
the log industry expenditure function, which quanties the cost of purchasing one unit of aggregate
output in a given industry.
13
We prove in Appendix C:
Proposition 2 (i) If the log expenditure function zt is a sucient statistic for competitor prices, i.e. if
the demand can be written as qit = qi(pit, zt; ξt), then the weights in the competitor price index (6) are
proportional to the competitor revenue market shares Sjt, for j 6= i, and given by ωijt ≡ Sjt/(1 − Sit).







(ii) Under the stronger assumption that the perceived demand elasticity is a function of the price of the
rm relative to the industry expenditure function, σit = σi(pit− zt; ξt), the two markup elasticities in (5)
are equal:
Γ−it ≡ Γit. (9)
12
Elasticity γit can be non-zero even under monopolistic competition when rm behavior is non-strategic, yet the com-
plementarities in pricing still exist via the curvature of demand. In this case, the term demand complementarity may be more
appropriate. Furthermore, γit could, in principle, be negative, in which case the prices of the rms are strategic substitutes.
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Formally, zt = log min{Qit}
{∑N
i=1 PitQit
∣∣U({Qit};Qt) = 1}, where U(·) is the (preference) aggregator, which
denes the unit of industry output Qt.
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The assumption underlying Proposition 2 is that the log expenditure function zt summarizes all
of the necessary information contained in the competitor price vector p−it, given the rm’s price pit.
By denition, this is the case from the point of view of the consumers of the industry output. In
general, however, the same is not the case for the competing rms supplying the product varieties
in the industry. Nonetheless, this assumption holds exactly for the nested-CES demand structure and
applies as a rst-order approximation for a broad class of models with symmetric preference structure.14
Intuitively, the symmetry assumption implies that the signicance of any rm for all other rms is fully
summarized by its market share, independently of the rm’s identity.
Proposition 2 then follows from Shephard’s lemma, which implies that the elasticity of the expen-
diture function with respect to rm j’s price equals rm j’s market share, ∂zt/∂pjt = Sjt. Conse-
quently, the relevant weights in the competitor price index (8) are proportional to the competitor mar-
ket shares Sjt. The assumption in part (ii) of the proposition implies that the markup function only
depends on the relative price, and hence it has the same elasticity with respect to the own price and the
competitor price index (in absolute value, with opposite signs), resulting in (9).
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Proposition 2 oers a useful way to empirically test the implication of its assumptions: the condition
on markup elasticities in (9) implies that the two coecients in the price decomposition (4) sum to one.
Using the notation in (7), this can be summarized as the following parameter restriction:
αit + γit = 1. (10)
We do not impose condition (9) and the resulting restriction (10) in our estimation, but instead test
it empirically. This also validates the weaker property (8) in Proposition 2, which we adopt for our
measurement of the competitor price changes, and then relax it non-parametrically in Section 3.4.
Structural elasticities Specic models of demand and competition structure link our two elasticities
of interest, αit and γit, to model primitives, and impose restrictions on the values of those elasticities.
For example, the most commonly used model in the international economics literature follows Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) and combines constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand with monopolistic
competition, which results in a constant σit ≡ σ, and hence constant-markup pricing µit ≡ log σσ−1 .
Consequently, there is complete pass-through of the cost shocks and no strategic complementarities in
price setting. In other words, all rms have zero markup elasticities, Γit = Γ−it ≡ 0, and therefore
αit ≡ 1 and γit ≡ 0. These implications are in gross violation of the stylized facts about price setting
in actual markets, a point recurrently emphasized in the pricing-to-market literature.
In order to allow for incomplete pass-through αit < 1 and strategic complementarities γit > 0, one
needs to depart from either the CES or the monopolistic competition assumption. We illustrate this
14
In general, consumers and producers put dierent weight on the cross-sectional dispersion of prices, resulting in dierent
price aggregators. In Appendix D, we show that Proposition 2 holds as a rst-order approximation for the Kimball demand
family; the same is true for the family of separable preference aggregators Qt=
∑N
i=1ui(Qit), as in Krugman (1979), as well
as for the broad homothetic families of demand considered in Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017).
15
More formally, under the conditions of Proposition 2, the markup function can be written asMi(pit−zt; ξt), and hence:
(i) ∂Mit/∂pjt = ∂Mit/∂zt · Sjt for all j 6= i and (ii) ∂Mit/∂pit = −∂Mit/∂zt, implying (8) and (9) respectively, as
follows from the denitions in (5) and (6).
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in the context of a specic model of variable markups with oligopolistic competition and nested-CES
demand, following Krugman (1987) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008). Under Cournot competition, the
perceived elasticity σit is a function of the rm’s market share, averaging the between- and within-






















is the industry price index, which is also the expenditure func-
tion. Note that this model satises the conditions of both Propositions 1 and 2.
Using the above expressions, we can write out the markup functionMi(pt; ξt) = log σitσit−1 for this
model, and calculate its respective elasticities according to (5), to yield:




which simplies to Γit = Γ−it = (ρ−1)Sit in the Cobb-Douglas case with η = 1. The main additional
insight from this example is that Γit is an increasing function of the rm’s market share Sit.
17
This rela-
tion is not exclusive to the nested-CES model, and holds more generally in many models of oligopolistic
and monopolistic price setting, as we show in Appendix D. For a broad class of models, the markup
elasticity is increasing in a rm’s market share, although the specic functional form underlying the
markup elasticities does depend on the model details. What is specic to the nested-CES model is the
property that Γit ≈ 0 for the very small rms with Sit ≈ 0. Indeed, such small rms behave nearly as
constant-markup monopolistic competitors, with a complete own cost pass-through (αit ≈ 1) and no
strategic complementarities (γit ≈ 0). In contrast, rms with positive market shares have Γit > 0, and
hence exhibit incomplete pass-through and positive strategic complementarities, αit < 1 and γit > 0.
Intuitively, when faced with a negative cost shock, a rm can either maintain its markup by in-
creasing its price and losing market share, or alternatively maintain its price and market share at the
expense of a declining markup. Small rms charge low markups and have only a limited capacity to
adjust them in response to shocks, and hence choose high pass-through of cost shocks into prices. In
contrast, large rms charge high markups and actively adjust them in response to shocks to ensure
stability of their market shares. This oers a sharp testable hypothesis.
Estimating equation We are interested in estimating the magnitudes of the pass-through and strate-
gic complementarity elasticities in the price change decomposition (4), as they form a sucient statistic
for rm i’s price responses to shocks, independently of the industry demand and competition structure.
16
The only dierence under Bertrand competition is that σit=ηSit + ρ(1−Sit); both cases are derived in Appendix C.
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Strictly speaking, for η > 1, Γit is non-monotonic in Sit, however the point of non-monotonicity only occurs for very
large Sit ≈ 1, well outside of the empirically-relevant range.
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In order to estimate these elasticities, we rewrite (4) in changes over time as:
∆pit = α∆mcit + γ∆p−it + εit, (13)
where ∆pit ≡ pi,t+1 − pit. Equation (13), which corresponds to the rst-order expansion of the rm’s
best response schedule, constitutes our estimating equation.
18
Implementing it in the data requires
measures of prices and marginal costs for the rm and its competitors, as well as an identication
strategy to address the simultaneity of ∆p−it and possible endogeneity of ∆mcit. Furthermore, while
there is merit in quantifying the average elasticities α and γ, the theory suggests that they should vary
with rm characteristics, in particular rm size.
3 Empirical Analysis
We start by describing our dataset and explaining the construction of the main variables. We then
present our baseline empirical results, followed by a detailed discussion of the threats to identication
and the robustness analysis.
3.1 Data and measurement
Dataset To empirically implement the theoretical framework of Section 2, we need to be able to mea-
sure each variable in equation (13). We do this by combining three dierent datasets for Belgian man-
ufacturing rms for the period 1995 to 2007 at the annual frequency. The rst dataset is rm-product
level production data (PRODCOM), collected by Statistics Belgium. A rare feature of these data is that
they contain highly disaggregated information on both values and quantities of sales, which enables us
to construct domestic unit values at the rm-product level. It is the same type of data that is more com-
monly available for rm-product exports. Firms in the Belgian manufacturing sector report production
values and quantities for all their products, dened at the PC 8-digit (over 1,500 products). The survey
includes all Belgian rms with a minimum of 10 employees, which covers over 90% of production value
in each NACE 4-digit industry.
19
Firms are required to report total values and quantities but are not
required to report the breakdown between domestic sales and exports. Therefore, to get a measure of
domestic values and quantities we merge on the export data from customs and subtract total export
values and quantities from total production values and quantities sold.
The second dataset, on imports and exports, is collected by Customs. These data are reported at
the rm level by destination and source country for each product classied at the 8-digit combined
18
Alternatively, we could estimate the equilibrium reduced form of the model, which expresses the rm’s price change as a
function of the exogenous shocks of the model. We provide an explicit solution for the reduced form in Appendix C, where
we also discuss the reasons why we focus on the best response (13), which include the feasibility of empirical implementation
and the ease of structural interpretation. Nonetheless, we report the reduced form estimates in the Online Appendix Table O1
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~itskhoki/papers/DomesticPricesOA.pdf.
19
We only keep rms that report their main activity to be in the manufacturing sector, dened as NACE 2-digit codes 15–36.
We dene an industry at the NACE 4-digit level (also corresponds to the rst 4 digits of the PC 8-digit code) and include all
industries for which there is a sucient number of domestic rms in the sample (around 160 industries). We choose this
level of aggregation in order to avoid huge market shares arising solely due to narrowly dened industries, and we show the
robustness of our results to more disaggregated industry denitions in Section 3.4.
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nomenclature (CN) in values and quantities, with around 10,000 distinct products. The rst 6 digits of
the CN codes correspond to the World Harmonized System (HS). Combining the production and trade
data is straightforward as both datasets include a unique rm identier; however, the matching of the
product codes across the two datasets is more complicated, as we describe in Appendix B.
The third dataset, on rm characteristics, draws from annual income statements of all incorporated
rms in Belgium. These data are used to construct measures of total variable costs. They are available
on an annual frequency at the rm level. Each rm reports its main economic activity within a 5-digit
NACE industry, but there is no individual rm-product level data available from this dataset.
Prices The main variable of interest is the price of the domestically sold goods, which we proxy
using the log change in the domestic unit value, denoted ∆pit, where i corresponds to a rm-product
at the PC-8-digit level. The domestic unit values equal the domestic sales divided by the quantity sold
domestically:




We clean the data by dropping the observations with abnormally large price jumps, namely with year-
to-year price ratios above 3 or below 1/3. Summary statistics for all variables are provided in the Ap-
pendix Table A1.
An essential, and rare, feature of our dataset is that we are able to measure price changes for all
domestic and foreign competitors of each rm in the home market. We follow Proposition 2 in con-
structing the full competitor price index ∆p−it. When selling goods in the Belgian market, Belgian
rms in the PRODCOM sample face competition from other Belgian rms that produce and sell their
goods in Belgium (also in the PRODCOM sample), as well as from the rms not in the PRODCOM sam-
ple that import goods to sell in the Belgian market. We refer to the former set of rms as the domestic
rms and the latter as the foreign rms. We follow Proposition 2 and equation (8), and calculate the full












where Di and Fi denote respectively the sets of domestic and foreign rm-product competitors of
rm i. The changes in individual prices ∆pjt are constructed at the most disaggregated level that
is possible in the data: for domestic competitors this is at the rm×PC8-digit level, and for foreign
competitors it is at the level of the importing-rm×source-country×CN8-digit. The market shares Sjt
are at the corresponding levels, dened as the ratio of the rm-product sales in Belgium relative to the
total sales in industry s.20
Marginal cost Good measures of rm marginal costs are notoriously hard to come by. We address
this challenge in two steps. First, we adopt a rather general production structure, where we assume
20




j∈FiSjt are the cumulative





j∈FiSjt=1−Sit). In practice, we measure Sjt as the average of t and t−1 market shares of rm-product j.
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that upon paying a xed cost the rm has access to a technology with a rm-specic returns-to-scale




where Yit is output and Cit is the unit cost of the rm independent from the scale of production. This
cost structure immediately implies that the log change in the marginal cost is equal to the log change
in the average variable cost:
21




We obtain total variable costs from the rm accounting data as the sum of the total material cost and
the total wage bill. We calculate the change in the log production quantity ∆ log Yit as the dierence
between ∆ log Revenuesit and ∆ log Price indexit of the rm, equal to the domestic-sales weighted
average of the log price changes ∆pit across the products produced by the rm. Note that ∆mcit is
calculated at the rm level and it acts as a proxy for the marginal cost of all products produced by the
rm. Importantly for our structural inference, this reects not just the exogenous cost shock, to which
the rm may adjust in various ways, but the full resulting change in the costs of the rm.
Second, because accounting measures of average costs are known to be very noisy, we construct
an instrument for the marginal cost ∆mcit. We use the rare feature of our dataset which enables
us to measure with great precision one component of the marginal cost, namely the cost changes of
the imported intermediate inputs. We assume that the unit cost of the rm Cit depends on the rm
productivity Ait, as well as the prices of its inputs, including labor and intermediates. We denote with
Wit and Vit the rm-i-specic cost indexes for domestic and imported inputs, respectively. The rst-
order expansion for the log marginal cost is then given by:
dmcit = φitdvit + (1− φit)dwit − dait + νidyit, (18)
where the small letters denote the logs of the corresponding variables and φit is the import intensity
of the rm, i.e. the expenditure share on imported inputs in total variable costs, which we measure as
the sum of the expenditure on home and foreign intermediates and the wage bill. We construct the
foreign-input component of a rm’s marginal cost, a counterpart to the rst term in (18), as follows:




where m indexes the rm’s imported inputs at the country of origin and CN-8-digit product level, and
21
It follows from (16) that the average variable cost isAV Cit =
1
1+νi
MCit, and the i-specic multiplicative factor in front
ofMCit cancels out when log changes are taken, given the time-invariant return-to-scale parameter. In the more general case,
which allows for a varying degree of returns to scale νit, our estimation is still valid, yet the structural interpretation of Γit
needs to be adjusted to reect curvature arising from both the demand and the cost sides (i.e., non-constant σit and νit).
Also note that the macroeconomic complementarities operating through the marginal cost, such as roundabout production
(Basu 1995) and local input markets (Woodford 2003), do not confound our estimates of the microeconomic complementarities.
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∆vimt denotes the change in the log unit values of the rm’s imported intermediate inputs (in euros).
22
The weights ωcimt are the average of t and t− 1 rm import shares of input m.
We nd that the projection of ∆mcit on the instrument ∆mc
∗
it yields a large and highly signicant
coecient of 0.97, providing support for our identication assumption that the accounting measure
of marginal cost ∆mcit is an unbiased measure of the true marginal cost. Our identication strategy
further relies on the presence of sucient variation in the rm’s marginal cost ∆mcit that is indepen-
dent from its competitor’s prices ∆p−it to identify the two elasticities in equation (13). In the data,
this correlation is extremely low at 0.09. It is important to note that even rms within the same in-
dustry source their inputs from dierent countries, giving rise to a large idiosyncratic shock in their
foreign marginal cost component: the correlation between ∆mc∗it and its counterpart for the domestic
competitors ∆mc∗−it is very low, equal to 0.27.
Baseline instruments To address the endogeneity of the competitor price index ∆p−it, we construct
instruments that proxy for the marginal costs of the dierent types of competitors faced by Belgian
rms in the domestic market. For the domestic competitors j∈Di (recall the rst term in (15)), we use







For foreign competitors j ∈ Fi (the second term in (15) comprising both euro and non-euro com-
petitors), direct measures of marginal costs at the rm level are unavailable in our data, and thus we
need to rely on product-level data to construct instruments for their price movements. For the non-euro








where ∆ekt is the euro exchange rate with country k and k(j) is the country of origin of the non-EZ
competitor j ∈ Xi.23
For the euro foreign competitors of rm i, j ∈ Ei, we construct a proxy for their marginal costs
using their export prices to all destination other than Belgium.
24
We construct this instrument in two
steps. In the rst step, we take all of Belgium’s euro trading partners and calculate weighted averages of
the change in their log export prices to all destination countries, except Belgium. Then for each product
at the CN 8-digit level we have the log change in the export price index for each of the 10 euro countries
(denoted k). In the second step, we aggregate these up to the 4-digit NACE industry level (denoted s),
using the value of imports of each product-country pair into Belgium as import weights, and denote
22
We drop abnormally large jumps in import unit values, and we take into account that not all imports are intermediate
inputs. In our baseline case, we dene an import to be a nal good for a rm if it also reports positive production of that good
(at PC-8 digit level); such imports are dropped from the calculation of ∆mc∗it.
23
The bilateral exchange rates are average annual rates from the IMF, reported for each country relative to the US dollar
and converted to be relative to the euro.
24
These data are from the Comext trade database of Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/international-trade/data/database);
all our calculations include Austria, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and exclude
Luxembourg.
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with ∆pMkst the resulting proxy for the Belgian import price index from country k in sector s. This







where k(j) denotes the country of origin of competitor j ∈Ei and s(i) is the industry of the Belgian
rm-product i. The idea is that movements in the price indexes ∆pMkst should correlate with movements
in European competitors’ marginal costs without being aected by the demand conditions in Belgium.






−it) — in our baseline analysis,
and provide an extensive discussion of the threats to identication and the ways in which we address
them in Section 3.3.
3.2 Empirical Results
We now turn to estimating the strength of strategic complementarities in price setting across Belgian
manufacturing industries.
Baseline estimates We regress the annual change in the log rm-product price ∆pit on the changes
in the rm’s log marginal cost ∆mcit and its competitors’ price index ∆p−it, as in equation (13). This
results in two estimated average elasticities, the own cost pass-through elasticity α and the strategic
complementarities elasticity γ. All of the equations are weighted using one-period lagged domestic
sales, and the standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit industry level. The rst two columns of Table 1
report the the OLS estimates, with year xed eects in column 1 and with both year and industry
xed eects in column 2. The coecients on both the rm’s marginal cost and on the competitors’
price index are positive, of similar magnitudes and signicant, yet the two coecients only sum to 0.7,
violating the parameter restriction of Proposition 2. These estimates, however, are likely to suer from
endogeneity bias due to the simultaneity of price setting by the rm and its competitors ∆p−it, as well
as from downward bias due to measurement error in our marginal cost variable ∆mcit. Indeed, while
our proxy for marginal cost, as described in equation (17), has the benet of encompassing all of the
components of marginal costs, it has the disadvantage of being measured with a lot of noise.
To address these concerns, we re-estimate equation (13) using our baseline instrument set, and
present the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 with the lower panel reporting the corresponding
rst-stage regressions. The coecients in the rst-stage regressions have the expected signs and are
strongly statistically signicant, and our instruments pass the Hansen overidentication J-tests and
the weak identication tests with the F -stats over 100, well above the critical value of around 12.
We see from our baseline IV estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 that both coecient estimates
increase relative to the OLS results in columns 1 and 2, with the coecient on the rm’s marginal
cost almost doubling in size. Moreover, the sum of the two coecients is now slightly above one,
yet we cannot reject the null that it equals one at the 5% signicance level. When we estimate the
constrained version of equation (13) in column 5, imposing α + γ = 1, the estimate of the coecient
on the rm’s marginal cost is unaected, equal to 0.6. This implies that the data are consistent with the
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Table 1: Strategic complementarities: baseline estimates
OLS IV




















(0.079) (0.095) (0.097) (0.118)
# obs. 64,823 64,823 64,823 64,823 64,823
Year F.E. yes yes yes yes yes
Industry F.E. no yes no yes yes
H0: ψ + γ = 1 0.747 0.669 1.137 1.133 yes
[p-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.16]
Overid J-test χ2 2.41 0.74 1.44
[p-value] [0.30] [0.69] [0.70]
Weak IV F -test 199.1 154.6 156.3
Table 1b: First-stage regressions
For column 3 For column 4


















(0.363) (0.217) (0.372) (0.238)
∆eX−it −0.407 0.637∗∗∗ −0.353 0.695∗∗∗





(0.226) (0.149) (0.281) (0.113)
First stage F -test 48.5 79.7 28.9 73.0
[p-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Notes: All regressions are weighted by lagged domestic rm sales and include year xed eects, with robust standard errors
clustered at the 4-digit industry level reported in parentheses. The lower panel presents the rst stage-regressions corre-
sponding to column 3 and 4 respectively. See the text for the denition of the instruments. The IV regressions pass the
weak instrument test with F -stats well above critical values and pass all overidentication tests. The null of Proposition 2
(i.e., parameter restriction (10) that α + γ = 1) cannot be rejected in both IV specications, while it is rejected in OLS
specications; column 5 reports the results of the IV estimation under the restriction α+ γ = 1.
class of models identied in Proposition 2, and our approach to measuring the competitor price index
according to (8) is not at odds with the data.
The results in Table 1 show that rms exhibit incomplete pass-through of their cost shocks, holding
constant the competitor prices, with an average elasticity α of around 0.6. At the same time, rms
exhibit substantial strategic complementarities, adjusting their prices with an average elasticity γ of
around 0.5 in response to the price changes of their competitors, in the absence of any own cost shocks.
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In other words, in response to a 10% increase in competitor prices, rm i raises its own price by almost
5%, accounted for entirely by an increase in its markup. These estimates are very stable across various
specications and subsamples, as we report in Section 3.4. The estimates of γ and α oer a direct
quantication of the average strength of strategic complementarities in price setting across Belgian
manufacturing rms.
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Heterogeneity of coecients We now explore rm heterogeneity, following the theory in Sec-
tion 2, and allow the two estimated elasticities to vary with rm size. Specically, we split our obser-
vations into subsamples for small and large rms, and estimate elasticities separately for each group.
26
We begin by dening a large rm as one with 100 or more employees on average over the sample
period. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report the results from IV estimation of equation (13) for the
sub-samples of small and large rms separately. In comparison to the average baseline results, we
nd that small rms have a larger coecient on their own marginal cost, equal to 0.97, insignicantly
dierent from 1, and a small and insignicant coecient of −0.05 on the competitor price index. In
contrast, large rms have a smaller coecient on their marginal cost, 0.48, and a larger coecient on
the competitor price index, 0.65, both statistically signicant. An alternative way to identify dierential
eects between small and large rms is to pool all rms in one equation and interact both right-hand-
side variables with a Largei dummy, as in column 3. We nd the same pattern of results, albeit with
more noisy estimates:
27
the two elasticities for the small rms are estimated at 1.01 and 0.02, while
these elasticities for the large rms are 0.49 (=1.01−0.52) and 0.62 (=0.02+0.60). Interestingly, despite
these dierences between large and small rms, we cannot reject that the sum of the elasticities within
each group still equals one, consistent with Proposition 2.
One potential concern with these results is that there could be industry-level correlated marginal
cost shocks. For example, if there is a global demand shock to an industry, input prices might increase
everywhere as producers increase production and therefore input demand. We address this concern
by additionally including industry×year xed eects in the next two columns of Table 2. In column 4,
we show that the results are robust to including very ne 4-digit industry×year xed eects, replacing
the competitor price index ∆p−it. This specication also addresses the potential concern about the
25
Using (7), we can convert these estimates to recover the average markup elasticity Γ in the range of 0.6–1.2 (recall that we
cannot reject Γ−it = Γit). These estimates are largely in line with the values suggested by Gopinath and Itskhoki (2011) based
on the analysis of various indirect pieces of evidence. In order to obtain substantial amplication of monetary non-neutrality
in the New Keynesian literature, some studies have adopted rather extreme calibrations with Γ > 5, an order of magnitude
above our estimates (see also Klenow and Willis 2016). Our results, however, do not imply that strategic complementarities
in price setting are unimportant for monetary business cycles, yet this mechanism alone cannot account for the full extent
of monetary non-neutralities and it needs to be reinforced by other mechanisms (such as roundabout production as in Basu
1995 or local input markets as in Woodford 2003).
26
Estimating pass-through and strategic complementarities by ner bins of rms (beyond a simple two-bin split) is dicult
because there are so few large rms. Indeed, our bin of small rms, with employment below 100, contains over 75% of
observations, yet accounts for less than 25% of total domestic sales. In contrast, extra-large rms with more than 1000
employees account for over 33% of sales, yet under 4% of observations, making separate estimation for this bin infeasible. We
describe alternative splits of the data in Appendix Figure A1.
27
Note that both interaction terms in column 3 of Table 2 are signicant when we use rm-level clustering or if we weight
the regressions with current sales instead of our more conservative industry-level clustering and lagged sales weights (see
the Online Appendix Table O2).
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Table 2: Strategic complementarities: heterogeneity
Largei denition: Employment ≥ 100 Top 20% Sit>2%
Sample: Small Large All All All All All













(0.160) (0.211) (0.128) (0.195) (0.221) (0.123)
∆mcit × Largei 0.478∗∗ −0.515 −0.297∗ −0.549 −0.235 −0.315
(0.203) (0.344) (0.178) (0.432) (0.364) (0.201)
∆p−it −0.047 0.019 0.134 0.208 0.100
(0.194) (0.237) (0.229) (0.205) (0.102)
∆p−it × Largei 0.645∗∗∗ 0.604∗ 0.668∗ 0.396 0.604∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.320) (0.403) (0.335) (0.187)
# obs. 49,469 15,354 64,823 64,823 64,822 64,823 64,823
Ind.&Year F.E. yes yes yes — — yes yes
Ind.×Year F.E. no no no 4-digit 2-digit no no
Overid. J-test χ2 2.26 0.49 5.62 — 4.96 5.42 4.98
[p-value] [0.32] [0.78] [0.23] [0.29] [0.25] [0.29]
Weak IV F -test 87.4 40.3 67.2 211.7 69.3 77.7 77.9
Notes: The denition of Largei in columns 1–5 is based on employment size and in columns 6–7 is based on rm’s sectoral
market share, as described in the text. All specications include variable Largei in levels, and observations are weighted with
lagged domestic rm sales. Regressions in columns 1–3 and 6–7 include 4-digit industry and year xed eects, with robust
standard errors clustered at the industry level, and the instrument set is as in Table 1. Column 4 includes 4-digit industry×year
xed eects and drops the competitor price variables, with standard errors clustered at the rm level; this specication is
exactly identied with two endogenous variables and two instruments ∆mc∗it and ∆mc
∗
it× Largei (hence no overid J-test).
Column 5 is the same as column 3, but with 2-digit industry×year xed eects. Appendix Table A3 reports the rst stages.
measurement of an appropriate competitor price index.
28
In column 5, we re-estimate column 3 adding
in broader 2-digit industry×year xed eects, to both control for sectoral demand shocks and directly
identify the strategic complementarity coecient on the competitor price changes. We nd the results
are almost identical to the baseline column 3.
In the last two columns of Table 2 we re-estimate the specication in column 3 using alternative
denitions of large rms based on a rm’s market share within its respective 4-digit industry: in col-
umn 6, we dene large rms to be those in the top 20% of their 4-digit industry by domestic sales; and




Since the variation in ∆p−it is predominantly at the industry-year level (accounting for more than 90% of the variation),
the strategic complementarity elasticity is identied largely from the panel data variation, and thus ∆p−it has to be excluded
when the 4-digit industry×year xed eects are included into the regression. The own pass-through elasticity, however, can
be identied from the within-industry-year variation in ∆mcit. Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, strategic comple-
mentarities can be recovered from these estimates using the parameter restriction (10), which implies an insignicant strategic
complementarity elasticity of 0.06 for small rms and a signicantly larger elasticity of 0.36 for large rms.
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Appendix Table A2 provides evidence that these heterogeneity results are not driven by spurious correlations in the data.
In particular, we check that the large-rm results are not driven by exporters or multinationals and the small-rm results are
not driven by non-importers. In addition, Appendix Table A3 reports the rst-stage regressions corresponding to columns 1–3
of Table 2, showing consistent patterns for both small and large rms.
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Our results suggest there is substantial heterogeneity in rms’ pass-through elasticities and strate-
gic complementarities in price setting. Namely, the small rms exhibit nearly complete pass-through
of cost shocks (α ≈ 1) and almost no strategic complementarities in price setting (γ ≈ 0), consis-
tent with the constant-markup behavior of monopolistic competitors under CES demand. Indeed, this
corresponds to the predicted behavior of rms with nearly zero market shares in the oligopolistic com-
petition model of Section 2. At the same time, the large rms behave very dierently, exhibiting both
incomplete pass-through of cost shocks (around 0.5) and strong strategic complementarities in price
setting (around 0.6).
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Since these largest rms account for the majority of market sales, their behavior
drives the average elasticities across all of manufacturing in the baseline results in Table 1.
3.3 Threats to identication
We now explore and address the possible threats to our baseline IV identication strategy. Although
our baseline instruments rely on dierent sources of variation and jointly pass the overidentication
tests, one may still be concerned with the validity of each of the instruments separately. We address
this by considering alternative instrument sets with the aim of excluding potential sources of endo-
geneity in the baseline specication. We show that our results are not sensitive to dropping any one
instrument, as well as to replacing them with alternative, more conservative, instruments. Since the
potential source of endogeneity for dierent subsets of instruments is not the same, the robustness of
our results across dierent sets of instruments adds condence about the validity of our identication
strategy (this argument is developed further, in a dierent context, by Duranton and Turner 2012).
The theoretical framework of Section 2 implies that the residual term εit in the estimating equa-
tion (13) is a transformation of the rm-specic demand shifters. Therefore, the two main identication
concerns are the presence of correlated demand (and cost) shocks at the industry level and at the rm
level. Correlated aggregate shocks that simultaneously raise the prices of inputs and output across
industries could arise, for example, due to aggregate or sector-specic business cycle uctuations or
global shifts in demand. Some of this is already absorbed by the year and industry xed eects in our
baseline specication. Furthermore, specications in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 include a very rich
set of interaction year×industry xed eects, which absorb all correlated time-varying industry-level
demand and cost shocks. Nevertheless, residual endogeneity concerns remain at the micro level, arising
from the within-industry or within-rm correlations. From this perspective, we consider the robustness
of each of the baseline instruments in turn.
First, we address a potential endogeneity concern with the instrument for the eurozone competitor
prices ∆pE−it, which comprises the changes in export prices of eurozone countries to destinations other
than Belgium as a proxy for the marginal costs of eurozone producers. If demand shocks are correlated
across Belgium and other eurozone countries, this may invalidate ∆pE−it. To mitigate this concern,
we replace the baseline ∆pE−it with a similarly constructed instrument that only uses export prices to
destinations outside the eurozone in column 1 of Table 3. We see that there is no change in the point
estimates compared to the baseline specication in column 4 of Table 1. As a further check, column 2
30
These large rms also have higher accounting prots and prot margins, in line with the predictions of the theory and
consistent with their price setting being prot maximizing.
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Table 3: Alternative instrument sets







































(0.114) (0.174) (0.239) (0.401) (0.283) (0.314) (0.267) (0.147)







Each column drops one or two of these instruments in turn, sometimes replacing them with alternative more conservative
instruments. Column 1 replaces ∆pE−it with one that only uses export prices to non-eurozone destination, and column 2
drops ∆pE−it altogether. Column 3 drops ∆mc
∗




−it. Column 4 adds instead
exchange-rate-based alternatives ∆eit and ∆e
∗
−it described in the text. Column 5 (6) additionally adds two new instruments
analogous to ∆mc∗it and ∆mc
∗
−it, which replace rm import prices with proxies based on source-country export prices to
countries other than Belgium (to outside the eurozone). Column 7 is like column 6, but with time-invariant rm-level weights
used to construct the instruments. Column 8 drops ∆eX−it, and hence excludes exchange rate variation from the instrument
set. In all cases, the regressions pass the weak instrument F -test and the overidentication J-test, and the null that the
coecients sum to one cannot be rejected; the number of observations is 64,823, as in the baseline regression.
drops the ∆pE−it instrument altogether, and again the point estimates hardly change, even though the
standard errors increase by about 50%.
Second, a similar concern may arise with our instrument ∆mc∗−it, proxying for the domestic com-
petitors’ marginal costs. In particular, if demand shocks are correlated between product i and the prod-
ucts imported by its domestic competitors j ∈ Di, this may result in ∆mc∗−it being correlated with
the residual εit. In column 3 of Table 3, we simply drop ∆mc
∗
−it from the instrument set. This leads to
little change from the baseline results, yet doubles the standard error on the competitor price index.
Third, one might be concerned about the endogeneity of our main instrument for the rm’s own
marginal cost, ∆mc∗it, which is constructed using changes in the individual imported input prices of
Belgian rms. The identication threat here could be of a similar nature as for ∆mc∗−it, namely cor-
related demand shocks for the product of rm i and its own imported inputs, which simultaneously
raise ∆pit and ∆mc
∗
it. But, perhaps more importantly, one should be concerned about various feedback
mechanisms, where endogeneity arises due to the rm upgrading the quality of its product, aecting
simultaneously its output and input prices, or due to upward sloping rm-level supply curves for inputs.
For example, an increase in demand for the product of the rm may require it to purchase more inputs,
leading the input suppliers to raise their prices in response.
We address this set of concerns in columns 4–7 of Table 3, where we reconstruct both baseline
instruments ∆mc∗it and ∆mc
∗
−it. In column 4, we replace both the rm-level marginal cost instru-
ment ∆mc∗it and the domestic competitors’ marginal cost instrument ∆mc
∗
−it with the corresponding
rm-level exchange rate based instruments ∆eit and ∆e−it, which are plausibly exogenous to the price
setting of the rm. Specically, in parallel with (19), we construct these instruments by weighting the
bilateral exchange rate changes with rm expenditure shares on imported inputs from respective source




imt∆emt, where m indicates the source country for each imported input
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of rm i. The competitor instrument ∆e−it is then constructed analogously to ∆mc
∗
−it in (20). In
this specication, we nd very similar point estimates to the baseline, however, imprecisely estimated.
What is important to note about this instrument set is that, by excluding all Belgian rm-level price
changes and relying exclusively on the exchange rate variation, we have lost instruments that proxy
for the bulk of imported inputs — from within the eurozone.
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We compensate for the lack of exchange rate variation within the eurozone by constructing two
new instruments to proxy for the imported inputs from eurozone countries without relying on the
actual prices paid by Belgian rms. In columns 5 and 6, we use country-specic export price changes
from eurozone countries to destinations other than Belgium and outside the eurozone, respectively. We
aggregate these price changes using Belgian rm-level expenditure shares on corresponding imported
inputs.
32
This restores the signicance levels of the two coecients of interest with little change in
their magnitudes. In column 7, we re-estimate the specication from column 6, but now with time-
invariant rm weights in all of the instruments, thereby excluding all Belgian rm-time variation from
the instrument set.
Finally, in column 8 of Table 3, we revert back to our baseline instrument set but drop our proxy for
the marginal costs of non-eurozone competitors ∆eX−it — the only instrument in the baseline set that
was constructed using exchange rate movements. This specication, therefore, excludes any potential
macroeconomic endogeneity that could arise from exchange rate variation. We nd that the point esti-
mates are unchanged relative to the baseline, but again with somewhat larger standard errors. Overall,
the similarity in the estimation results across the dierent specications in Table 3 helps alleviate the
concerns about the validity of the instruments.
In all of these robustness checks, with some excluding rm-level price variation from the instrument
set and others excluding exchange rate variation, we reach the same qualitative conclusions as in the
baseline case and, if anything, the estimates of strategic complementarities become somewhat stronger.
Therefore, we view our baseline estimates of strategic complementarities as conservative.
3.4 Additional robustness
We now provide a number of additional robustness checks to address other potential concerns with the
baseline results, which include quality upgrading by rms, multiproduct rms, and alternative measures
of the competitor price index.
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The only instrument that contains price changes, rather than exchange rate changes, is ∆pE−it, but these are product-level
prices that proxy for competition from the eurozone, and there is no proxy for imported inputs from the eurozone.
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In parallel with ∆mc∗it in (19), which comprises the price changes of imported inputs from all countries, we construct a
separate new instrument ∆pMit to proxy for the component of the rm’s marginal cost arising from the eurozone-imported
inputs, where we replace the rm-level import price changes ∆vimt with the average product-level export prices from the






k(m)s(m)t, where E is the set of the eurozone-sourced inputs, ω
c
imt are
still the rm-level import expenditure weights, k(m) and s(m) denote the source country and industry of input m, and
∆pXkst is the change in the export price index from eurozone country k in industry s to all destinations other than Belgium
in column 5 and outside the eurozone in column 6. Using ∆pMit , we construct the domestic competitors’ price instrument
∆pM−it by analogy with (20), which should be noted is distinct from the instrument p
E
−it in (21) for eurozone competitors.
Finally, for column 7, we additionally replace ωcimt with time-invariant ω̄
c
im, which are time-averaged at the rm level.
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index All rms Large rms productivity share













(0.175) (0.151) (0.258) (0.116) (0.118) (0.111)














(0.191) (0.207) (0.346) (0.122) (0.124) (0.118)
∆p−it ×Ri 0.088 0.207 0.033
(0.270) (0.247) (0.360)
∆ log TFPit 0.074
∗∗∗
(0.018)





# obs. 64,823 64,823 15,354 64,247 64,405 61,004
Notes: All regressions are counterpart to column 4 of Table 1. In column 1, Ri is a dummy for whether rm-product i
is in a dierentiated sector according to the Rauch classication. In columns 2 and 3, Ri is a dummy for whether rm i
records any positive R&D expenditure during the sample; column 3 limits the sample to the large rms only (as in column 2
of Table 2). Columns 4–6 add controls for rm-level changes in measured log TFP, log value added per worker and skill share
of non-production workers, respectively.
Quality and productivity There may still be remaining concern about the correlation between the
residual term and the rm’s imported input prices that could arise if a rm were to endogenously ad-
just quality and/or productivity in response to changes in its own input costs or in its competitors’
prices, and violate the orthogonality of the instruments with εit.
33
If endogenous quality upgrading
were to bias our results, we would expect this to be more likely in industries where the scope for qual-
ity upgrading is high. In column 1 of Table 4, we address this concern by checking if the coecients in
dierentiated industries, according to the Rauch classication, dier with those in homogeneous indus-
tries, as we expect the scope for quality upgrading to be higher in dierentiated industries (see e.g. Fan,
Li, and Yeaple 2018). We nd no statistically dierential eects for dierentiated versus homogeneous
industries.
34
Another way of identifying industries with possibly elastic quality adjustment is to use measures
of R&D intensity, as in Fan, Li, and Yeaple (2018) and Verhoogen (2008) at the industry level. We
extend this approach by using rm-level R&D data, and compare R&D-intensive rms with the non-
R&D-intensive rms. Again, if quality upgrading were biasing our results, we would expect to nd
evidence of that bias for rms that were engaging in R&D. To identify these rms, we create a rm-level
33
Note that the change in productivity and in the input mix are not part of our instrument set, and therefore are not a direct
concern on its own, if demand shifter (quality) shocks and imported input price changes are not correlated.
34
We also checked if there were any dierential eects for high vs low elasticity of substitution industries using estimates
from Broda and Weinstein (2006). Again, we found no statistical dierences in either of the coecients.
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indicator equal to 1 if the rm ever had positive expenditures on R&D during our sample period.
35
We
interact this dummy with the rm’s marginal cost and competitor price variables in column 2 of Table 4.
Both interaction terms are insignicant but the point estimates suggest eects for R&D-intensive rms
similar to large rms, which is not surprising given that large rms are the more R&D intensive rms.
So in column 3, we re-estimate column 2 for the subset of large rms, dened as those with average
employment above 100.
36
The interactive coecients are again insignicant and now much closer to
zero in magnitude, suggesting that quality upgrading is unlikely to be biasing our results.
An additional way to check for quality-upgrading bias is to control for the change in the measures of
rm productivity, with the premise that productivity changes and quality upgrading are correlated. In
column 4, we nd a positive signicant coecient on the log change in measured (revenue-based) TFP,
but its inclusion leaves the coecients on marginal costs and competitor prices unchanged. Firms with
an increase in measured TFP start charging higher prices, possibly because of higher quality (or higher
markups), but this does not aect the elasticities α and γ we estimate, consistent with the assumption
of the validity of our instruments. Similarly, replacing the change in TFP with a change in the labor
productivity (value added per worker) in column 5 leads to the same conclusion. In column 6, we
control for the change in the skill composition of the labor force, dened as the number of managers
and nonproduction workers as a share of the total labor force. We nd the coecient on the change in
the skill share is insignicant and leaves the coecients on the key variables of interest unchanged.
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Multiproduct rms An important potential concern is that the marginal cost variable is constructed
at the rm level, whereas our unit of observation is at the rm-product level, resulting in measurement
error biasing downwards the coecient on the own marginal cost. It is generally dicult to assign
costs across products within rms. To check that this multiproduct issue is not biasing our results, we
conduct a number of robustness tests in Table 5. First, in columns 1 and 2, we restrict the sample to the
rm’s largest product in terms of domestic sales, dened at the PC 8-digit in column 1 and at the NACE
4-digit in column 2.
38
If present, the measurement error from assigning the inputs proportionally to
all products of the rm should be considerably smaller in these specications. We nd no change in
the results relative to our baseline, suggesting at most a limited role for a potential measurement error
bias. Nonetheless, we provide further robustness checks in columns 3 and 4, where we construct a rm-
product level measure of ∆mcit by apportioning inputs to products using the IO tables, as in Manova
35
These data come from ECOOM (https://www.ecoom.be/en/services/rd). Because there was a change in the way these
data were collected in 2002, we cannot use the time variation so we assume that rms that engaged in R&D in any year are
R&D-intensive over the whole sample period.
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Few rms report positive R&D expenditure, and even in the large-rm subsample only about half of the observations
have an R&D dummy equal to 1.
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We also check whether currency movements, which were used as instruments in some specications, are associated with
systematic change in the set of imported inputs, which could in turn aect the quality of output, measured marginal costs
and prices. We nd no evidence of such extensive margin adjustment at the annual frequency that we focus on. Similarly, we
show that the rm’s import intensity φit is not sensitive to exchange rate movements at the annual frequency, as 90% of the
variation in φit is explained by rm xed eects. We report these results in the Online Appendix Tables O4 and O5.
38
We prefer this approach over limiting the sample to single-product rms only, as single-product rms constitute a very
selected sample of small rms. We report the results from the sample of single-product rms in the Online Appendix Table O3.
Also note that the products dropped by multiproduct rms account for 10% of the observations, but only 3% of the value,
suggesting that multiproduct rms drop peripheral products, consistent with the literature.
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Table 5: Robustness: alternative samples and variables
Main product
IO-table Two-period Finer industries
input allocation dierences 5-digit 6-digit






























(0.192) (0.177) (0.135) (0.131) (0.210) (0.174) (0.143)
# obs. 27,031 48,284 64,823 64,823 51,322 64,350 62,713
Notes: All regressions are counterpart to column 4 of Table 1. Columns 1 and 2 include only observations for the rm’s
largest product in terms of domestic sales: column 1 at the 8-digit product category level and column 2 at the 4-digit industry
level. Columns 3 and 4 construct a rm-product level measure of ∆mcit by apportioning inputs to products using IO tables
(weighted and simple averages of rm inputs in column 3 and 4, respectively). Column 5 is in two-period (year) dierences.
Columns 6 and 7 dene all competition variables relative to 5- and 6-digit industries, respectively.
and Yu (2017). Since the IO tables are far more aggregated than the import data, we aggregate rm
inputs up to the IO level using rm-expenditure weighted averages in column 3 and simple input count
averages in column 4. The competitor marginal cost is also reconstructed using these new rm-product
level measures. We again nd no material change in our baseline results.
Dynamic price setting Our theoretical framework of Section 2 relies on the assumption of static
exible price setting. If, instead, prices were set dynamically, as for example in sticky price models,
the markups of rms could mechanically move with shocks, resulting in incomplete pass-through of
marginal cost shocks.
39
More generally, with sticky prices we would expect the price changes to be
on average smaller for any given set of shocks, as some rms fail to adjust prices. Consequently, we
would expect downward biased estimates for both elasticities, with less biased estimates over longer
horizons, as more rms have time to fully adjust their prices (see Gopinath and Itskhoki 2010). Column 5
of Table 5 re-estimates the baseline specication with all of the variables constructed using two-year
dierences instead of the baseline annual dierences, to address the concern of price stickiness and
other types of dynamic considerations in price setting. We nd that the coecients in the specication
with bi-annual dierences are very similar to the baseline, albeit somewhat less precisely estimated as
the sample size shrinks, with the sum of the two elasticities still close to one. This suggests that price
stickiness and other dynamic considerations in price setting do not bias our baseline annual-frequency
results in a major way.
Competitor price index There may be a number of potential concerns arising from the construction
of the price index. First is the denition of an industry. If it is too broad, the competitor price index
may not accurately reect the relevant competition and could lead to biased estimates. In our baseline,
we dene an industry at the 4-digit NACE level, which divides the 1,500 8-digit products in our sample
into about 160 industries. In columns 6 and 7 of Table 5, we redene the competition variables at
39
Our estimated elasticities are still informative even when price setting is dynamic, as they can be used for indirect inference
in the context of a dynamic model. It is also possible to generalize our framework to explicitly allow for dynamic price setting,
which however would result in an estimating equation that is specic to a particular dynamic model.
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Table 6: Robustness: alternative measures of competitor prices
Placebo with random Largest Placebo
industry assignment competitor(s) with ∆mc−it






























# obs. 64,823 64,823 64,823 64,823 64,780
Notes: All regressions build on the baseline specication in column 4 of Table 1. Columns 1 and 2 add a randomly constructed
price index ∆p̃−it for ctitious competitors randomly assigned to the industry. Column 3 (4) splits the competitor price index
into the price changes for the largest competitor(s) ∆pL−it and the other competitors ∆p
−L
−it, as described in the text and
footnote 40. Column 5 includes domestic competitor marginal costs ∆mc−it.
the more narrow 5- and 6-digit industry levels, splitting products into roughly 270 and 320 industries,
respectively. We nd the results to be qualitatively robust under these alternative denitions.
Second, one might worry that the positive coecient on the competitor price index arises from a
mechanical relationship due to the correlated price changes. We alleviate this concern by showing that
the positive coecient disappears if we were to construct the competitor price index from ctitious
industries. We estimate these placebo regressions by randomly assigning each rm-product-year to
one of 8-digit products, and then calculate a counterfactual industry-year competitor price index and
associated instruments using this random set of rms within each NACE 4-digit industry. We nd, in
column 1 of Tabel 6, that the coecient on such a competitor price index (which we denote ∆p̃−it)
is estimated to be 0.04 with a standard error of 0.11. When we additionally control for the actual
competitor price index (∆p−it), in column 2, the coecient on the counterfactual competitor price
index drops to 0.004 with a standard error of 0.094, that is a very precisely estimated zero. We also note,
from comparing columns 1 and 2, that when the true competitor price index is omitted, the regression
erroneously recovers a nearly complete pass-through of 0.95 on rms’ own marginal cost shocks.
Third, we check the validity of our baseline measurement of the competitor price index ∆p−it,
which relied on Proposition 2 and aggregated all competitor price changes weighting by their market
shares. Instead, rms may put a higher or lower weight on prices of a particular subset of competitors,
e.g. the largest rms in the industry. In column 3 of Table 6, we test the null of Proposition 2 by splitting
the competitor price index ∆p−it into the largest competitor ∆p
L
−it and all other competitors ∆p
−L
−it,
and premultiply them by their respective market shares, to test whether the rm is equally sensitive
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to the two resulting variables.
40
Both estimated coecients are signicant, close to 0.5, and nearly
indistinguishable quantitatively. In column 4, we redene ∆pL−it to correspond to all rms within-
industry with at least 2% market share. In this case, we nd that the coecient on the large rms is
somewhat smaller (equal to 0.4) than that on the other rms (equal to 0.6), although the dierence is
not statistically signicant. These results conrm that the importance of competitors is appropriately
proxied by their market shares, consistent with Proposition 2 and the construction of our baseline
competitor price index ∆p−it.
Finally, column 5 includes the marginal cost index for the rm’s competitors ∆mc−it, which accord-
ing to Proposition 1 should have no eect on rm pricing once we control for competitor prices ∆p−it.
This theoretical prediction is again borne out by the data.
In sum, we nd strong robust evidence of positive strategic complementarities, with substantial
heterogeneity across small and large rms.
4 Exchange Rate Depreciation and Domestic Price Ination
We now apply the general framework of the earlier section, with our elasticity estimates, to study
the eects of an exchange rate depreciation on aggregate domestic prices and markups.
41
We use this
framework to study the underlying transmission mechanism from rm-level shocks to sector-level
price and markup adjustment. In particular, we show that the transmission of shocks into aggregate
prices depends not just on the presence of strategic complementarities, but more importantly on the
heterogeneity in markup variability across rms of the sort we document in Section 3. We study under
what circumstances aggregate markups fall in response to an exchange rate depreciation and act to
mute the response of domestic price ination, thereby shedding light on the low exchange rate pass-
through observed in the data (see e.g. Goldberg and Campa 2010).
4.1 From micro to macro
We start with the rm-level price setting behavior and show how import intensities and strategic
complementarities of individual rms serving the home market aggregate up and shape the price and
markup responses at the aggregate (sectoral) level. Towards this goal, we specialize the price change de-
composition in equation (4) to the case of an exchange rate shock det > 0, corresponding to a domestic




























where expectations are taken over possible realizations of the rms’ idiosyncratic shocks. We as-
sume that idiosyncratic demand shocks are not systematically correlated with the exchange rate shock,
40




−it + (1 − SL−it)∆p−L−it,
where SL−it = maxj 6=i Sjt/(1− Sit), where j denotes rm i’s competitors within a 4-digit industry.
41
Our framework is suitable for the analysis of any shock that aects marginal costs dierentially across rms, for example,
import taris or the “rise of China” (i.e., the productivity growth in a major trade partner).
26
i.e. E{dεit/det} = 0, which is a realistic assumption in the context of individual products in dieren-
tiated industries.
In (22), ψit denotes rm i’s exchange rate pass-through (ERPT), Ψ−it is the ERPT into its competitor
prices, and ϕit is its marginal cost sensitivity (or exposure) to the exchange rate. We assume that the




1−Sitψjt and Γit = Γ−it, consistent
with our empirical estimates. These restrictions prove useful for tractable aggregation. To further
simplify the analysis, we make a strong assumption that ϕit can be proxied by the import intensity of
the rm φit, which we observe in the data. That is, we assume that a rm’s exposure to the exchange
rate ϕit reects its share of foreign value added in total variable costs.
42
While we view this as a natural
assumption for our baseline quantication, the theoretical results below apply more generally for any
structure of cost shocks {ϕit}, which may dier from the observable expenditure shares {φit}.












i=1 Sitdpit is the sectoral price ination andN is the total number of rms in the sector,
including both domestic and foreign rms. The aggregate cost sensitivity to the exchange rate is a










We view ϕ̄t as the foreign value added content of the aggregate sectoral output, embodied partly in out-
put supplied by the foreign rms and partly in foreign intermediate inputs used by the domestic rms.
In a competitive model with marginal cost pricing, ϕ̄t is a sucient statistic for ERPT, as it does not
matter whether foreign value added reaches the domestic market in the form of output or intermediate
inputs. As we will shortly see, this distinction, and in particular the distribution of {ϕit} across rms,
matter a lot in a world of imperfect competition with strategic complementarities in pricing.
The dierence between Ψt and ϕ̄t captures the aggregate markup response to the shock, which
aggregates the markup responses of individual rms, Ψt − ϕ̄t =
∑N
i=1 Sit(ψit − ϕit). The rm-level






= ψit − ϕit = −κit(ϕit −Ψt), where κit ≡
Γit
1− Sit + Γit
. (25)
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There are a number of caveats to this assumption. First, the pass-through into foreign input prices may be incomplete;
there may be correlated adjustment in the prices of domestically-produced inputs; or some of the foreign inputs may reach
non-importing home rms via domestic wholesalers. While these factors could raise or lower the level of aggregate ERPT,
our qualitative conclusions about the aggregate markup adjustment still hold provided the ranking of ϕit across rms re-
mains unchanged. Second, exchange rate movements may trigger rms to adjust their cost structure, including sources of
intermediate inputs, or to invest in quality and productivity-upgrading. While such changes are likely to occur over longer
horizons and in response to larger exchange rate devaluations, they are less prevalent for typical exchange rate movements
at the annual frequency, which is our focus here. Still, our main results apply more generally, provided ϕit is reinterpreted
to capture both the intensive and extensive margin responses over longer horizons.
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Note that κit ∈ [0, 1) increases in the markup elasticity Γit and captures the elasticity of the rm’s
price to the sectoral price index, while 1−κit is the rm’s own cost pass-through elasticity holding the
sectoral price index constant.
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It follows from (25) that a rm reduces its markup if ϕit > Ψt, that is if
its costs are aected more by the shock than the average price, and hence the rm loses its competitive
standing in the industry.
We now explore the conditions when the aggregate (industry) markup declines in response to an
exchange rate depreciation, muting the aggregate ERPT, Ψt < ϕ̄t. We assume a stable set of N rms
operating in the industry, without entry or exit, in line with the medium-run focus of our analysis.
Under these assumptions, we prove the following main result:





















i=1Sit(κit − κ̄t)ϕit is a sales-weighted covariance.
Proposition 3 shows that, in general, in the presence of strategic complementarities, κit=
Γit
1−Sit+Γit 6=0,
the aggregate pass-through into prices Ψt diers from that into costs ϕ̄t. This, however, requires
heterogeneity in both the cost shocks ϕit and the markup elasticities Γit, as well as a correlation be-
tween them, as we highlight in the following two corollaries. In the rst corollary, we consider two
special cases where the aggregate markup does not change in response to cost shocks.
Corollary 1 (i) If ϕit ≡ ϕ̄t, constant across all rms i, then Ψt = ϕ̄t (aggregate ERPT is complete) and
all individual markups and the aggregate markup remain unchanged, independently of {Sit,Γit}Ni=1.
(ii) For any cost shock prole {ϕit}Ni=1, if κit =
Γit
1−Sit+Γit = const for all rms i, then Ψt = ϕ̄t and the
aggregate markup is constant, even if all Γit > 0 and individual markups adjust to the shock.
The rst part of Corollary 1 emphasizes that the presence of strategic complementarities (Γit > 0) in
itself is insucient to lead to markup adjustment, even at the individual rm level, if rms face common
(aggregate) cost shocks. The rm’s direct response to a cost shock may be incomplete, with a pass-
through elasticity of 1/(1+Γit), but there are further rounds of adjustment as rms respond to changes
in their competitors’ prices. When all rms face the same shock, the xed point equilibrium outcome
is the complete pass-through of the cost shock into prices, which leaves relative prices unchanged.
As a result, there is no change in rms’ relative competitiveness, and hence no markup adjustment in
response to such shocks.
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Interestingly, from the second part of Corollary 1, even if rms were hit by heterogeneous cost
shocks, the aggregate markup would not change in the absence of rm-level heterogeneity in markup
43
Elasticities κit and (1 − κit) dier from those we estimate in Section 3 when rms are large, i.e. Sit > 0, while under
monopolistic competition (with Sit → 0 for all i) they are the same. Formally, 1 − κit and 1/(1 + Γit) both capture
dpit/dmcit, where the former holds the full price index constant (dpt = 0), while the latter holds the competitor price index
constant (dp−it = 0).
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In the long run, as the industry responds to the cost shock with entry and exit of rms, the average markup may change
even under the conditions of Corollary 1.
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elasticities. This would occur, for example, under monopolistic competition (withN →∞ and Sit → 0
for all i) and a common markup elasticity Γit = Γ for all rms i, which implies κit =
Γ
1+Γ is constant.
This nests the conventional CES case, but it is considerably more general, as it does not require Γ = 0.
Indeed, with Γ > 0, Corollary 1 allows for arbitrary strong strategic complementarities and incomplete
pass-through at the rm level. With some rms more exposed to the cost shock than others (e.g., foreign
versus home rms), their competitive standing in the industry changes, and they adjust their markups
dierentially. In particular, as some rms gain sales shares and increase their markups, other rms
lose sales shares and reduce their markups.
45
With a common markup elasticity, the individual markup
increases and decreases exactly oset each other, and the aggregate markup remains unchanged.
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The second part of Corollary 1 is a powerful, and perhaps surprising, implication of Proposition 3,
as it suggests that the eects of strategic complementarities may well wash out in the aggregate, re-
sulting in exactly zero adjustment to the aggregate markup, despite the arbitrary heterogeneity in the
cost shocks {ϕit} across rms.47 In order for markups to adjust at the aggregate level in response to
a cost shock, there must be a systematic heterogeneity in markup elasticities Γit, correlated with the
exposure to the cost shock ϕit across rms, as we illustrate in:
Corollary 2 If Γit and ϕit are increasing with rm size Sit, then Ψt < ϕ̄t and the aggregate markup
in the home market declines in response to an exchange rate depreciation, muting the exchange rate pass-
through into domestic price ination.




> 0, and thus by Proposition 3 Ψt < ϕ̄t. The ev-
idence in Section 3 shows that this case is indeed empirically relevant: we nd that large rms have
large markup elasticities, and these are also the import intensive rms (see Appendix Table A1). Corol-
lary 2 suggests that it is specically this type of interaction between strategic complementarities and
rm heterogeneity that causes a muted price response to exchange rate uctuations in the aggregate.
Intuitively, if the large rms are the ones that are most aected by the shock, they will adjust their
markups such that the cost shock is only partially passed through to prices. Since the small rms have
low exposure to the shock and almost no strategic complementarities, this set of rms will not su-
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Although the reallocation of sales shares across rms with dierent levels of markups is potentially an important source
of change in the average markup in the economy, this composition eect does not directly contribute to the aggregate pass-
through into prices in (23) and (26), conditional on the measured marginal cost shocks {ϕit}; however, this reallocation may
have an indirect general equilibrium eect on marginal costs via factor prices, as explored in Baqaee and Farhi (2018).
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To gain intuition for this case, consider the direct and the indirect eects of price adjustment, represented respectively by
(1− κ)ϕit and κΨt at the rm level. When κ is the same for all rms, the aggregation implies Ψt = (1− κ)ϕ̄t + κΨt, and
hence Ψt = ϕ̄t independently of the value of κ. In words, in the aggregate, the partial direct response to the shock, (1−κ)ϕ̄t,
is complemented by the strategic-complementarity-driven indirect response of all rms, κΨt, which by the equilibrium xed
point ensures complete aggregate pass-through, Ψt = ϕ̄t, and hence no aggregate markup adjustment. Stronger strategic
complementarities (higher κ), reduce the direct (pass-through) response to the shock, but increase the indirect (strategic
complementarity) response, leaving the aggregate pass-through unchanged.
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This result in Corollary 1 has been noted in the exchange rate pass-through literature (see Burstein and Gopinath 2014,
Itskhoki and Mukhin 2017). It also resonates with the “elusive pro-competitive eects of trade” in ACDR, yet their result of no
aggregate markup adjustment is obtained under very dierent conditions. The ACDR result operates via the extensive margin
adjustment in general equilibrium, in an environment with Pareto-distributed rm productivities, no input-output linkages,
and a demand system with a choke-o price, binding for some rms. Our result instead holds in any partial equilibrium with
a given number of rms, independently of what happens to factor prices in general equilibrium, and independently from the
input-output structure and the productivity distribution across rms.
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ciently increase markups to oset the large rms’ adjustment. Therefore, the reduction in the large
rms’ markups translates into a reduction in the aggregate markup.
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The conventional view is that a currency depreciation gives a competitive edge to the domestic
rms, which allows them to raise markups in the domestic market in response to higher prices of for-
eign competitors. Indeed, this holds true if all rms share the same markup elasticity, as in the second
part of Corollary 1. However, this is not the case in general, and in particular under the conditions of
Corollary 2, the average markup of the home rms may decline in response to a home currency depre-
ciation.
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We explore this possibility below using a quantitative model and nd that, in contrast with
the conventional view, a decrease in the average markup of the home rms is indeed the likely outcome.
The new results in Proposition 3 have important implications for the international transmission of
shocks into the relative price levels across countries. Markup adjustment at the rm level and the re-
sulting violations of the law of one price across markets have been emphasized by the pricing-to-market
literature.
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Our results, however, suggest that in the absence of heterogeneity in markup elasticities,
rm-level pricing-to-market does not translate into changes in aggregate markups across markets, and
hence has no eect on the relative price levels across countries. In other words, the presence of the
micro-level pricing-to-market does not ensure, in general, the violations of the purchasing power par-
ity (PPP) at the aggregate. It is the heterogeneity in markup variability across rms, in particular of
the sort we document in the data, which is necessary for the pricing-to-market mechanism to have
aggregate consequences for the relative price levels and the real exchange rate, and hence contribute
to the explanation of the PPP puzzle (Rogo 1996).
4.2 Quantitative model
We now study the response of markups to an exchange rate depreciation in a quantitative industry
equilibrium model, disciplined using Belgian manufacturing data. We adopt the Atkeson and Burstein
(2008) model of oligopolistic competition under nested-CES demand and explore robustness in a model
of monopolistic competition with non-CES (Kimball) demand in Appendix D. In these models, rm-level
markup elasticities Γit emerge endogenously as an outcome of an industry price-setting game given
the structure of demand and competition. We relegate the full setup and calibration of the models to
Appendix D, and provide here only a brief description and a summary of our ndings.
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The result that a small number of large rms exerts an aggregate impact is reminiscent of the granularity literature
following Gabaix (2011), which however typically assumes no markups (for an exception, see Gaubert and Itskhoki 2018).
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Formally, one can aggregate (25) across home rms to see that a necessary condition for the average home markup to
decline is an existence of some domestic rm(s) with an exposure to the foreign inputs in excess of the aggregate pass-through
into prices, ϕit > Ψt. Empirically, this condition is easily met, as some of the largest domestic rms indeed rely heavily on
foreign-sourced intermediate inputs. In Appendix C, we develop a simple analytical example of an industry with three types
of rms — small and large home rms and large foreign rms — serving the home market. In addition to the conditions
of Corollary 2, this example emphasizes that for the average markup of the home rms to decline, a considerable portion
of foreign value added in the sector must come in the form of intermediate inputs used in production by large home rms,
rather than as imported competing output goods.
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Consistent with pricing-to-market, we nd that the large rms reduce markups in the home market in response to a
home currency depreciation, while these same rms increase markups considerably in the foreign destinations, as we show
in Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014).
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Table 7: Strategic complementarities in the quantitative model
Dep. var.: ∆pit All Small Large Interaction
∆mcit 0.532 0.899 — 0.900
∆mcit × Largeit — — 0.424 −0.393
∆p−it 0.417 0.060 — 0.066
∆p−it × Largeit — — 0.529 0.335
Note: The regressions parallel those in column 4 of Table 1 and columns 1, 2 and 4 of Table 2. As in the data, the observations
include only home rms, while ∆p−it includes both home and foreign competitors of the rm. Largeit is a dummy for
whether the rm belongs to the top 20% of home rms by home-market sales within each industry (as in column 6 of Table 2).
Observations are weighted by rm sales. Regressions include industry and year xed eects, and are IV regressions using
φi∆et and φ−i∆et as instruments. The reported coecients are averaged over 20 simulations, each with 50 industries and
11 years of observations, to eliminate small sample variation.








whereWt is the price index of domestic inputs, V
∗
t is the foreign-currency price index of foreign inputs,
Et is the nominal exchange rate with an increase in Et indicating a depreciation of the home currency,
and Ait is the idiosyncratic rm productivity, which we assume is drawn from a Pareto distribution.
The rm specic parameter φi captures the exposure of the rm to foreign inputs, and we assume it
is constant over the medium run that we focus on. We assume that the home and foreign rms dier
in their exposure to foreign inputs, with φi ≡ φ∗ for all foreign rms and φi < φ∗ for home rms
and varying with the size of the home rms, as in the data. Lastly, only a subset of the most produc-
tive foreign rms can enter the home market, in line with the empirical evidence on rm selection
into exporting.
We focus on a partial industry equilibrium with exogenous idiosyncratic productivity and exchange
rate shocks. We assume that the log of the exchange rate follows a random walk and the logs of rm-
level productivities follow a random walk with drift and idiosyncratic shocks, which maintains the sta-
bility of the cross-sectional productivity distribution (as in Gabaix 2009). Consistent with the evidence
on exchange rate disconnect, we assume that the prices of local inputs Wt and V
∗
t are not correlated





the rms’ marginal cost exposure to exchange rates equals their foreign input shares, ϕi = φi, as we
assumed in the analysis above.
Given the demand and marginal costs, rms play a Cournot price setting game, resulting in the
optimal markup pricing, as characterized in Section 2. We calibrate the parameters of the model to be
broadly in line with the features of a typical Belgian manufacturing industry. In particular, we set the
51
See Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017) for a fully-specied model of exchange rate disconnect, driven by shocks to the exchange
rate in the nancial markets, which exhibits similar properties in general equilibrium. One can adopt alternative assumptions
about ERPT into local input prices Wt and V
∗
t , however, since this does not change the heterogeneity prole of {ϕit} across
rms, it is inconsequential for the pattern of markup adjustment, which is our focus here.
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Table 8: Exchange rate pass-through in the quantitative model
Sets of rms
ERPT into: All Firms All Home Large Home Small Home All Foreign
Costs ϕ̄J 0.300 0.200 0.245 0.121 0.700
Prices ΨJ 0.238 0.185 0.217 0.131 0.475
Markups ΨJ−ϕ̄J −0.062 −0.015 −0.028 0.010 −0.225
Note: The table reports a counterfactual response to a 10% home currency depreciation, averaged across 10,000 industries;
ϕ̄J and ΨJ are sales-weighted averages of ϕi and ψi, respectively, for i ∈ J , where Js are the dierent subsets of rms.
Large corresponds to the top 20% of home rms by sales within each industry.
elasticity of demand to match the pass-through estimates in Section 3 and the Pareto shape parameter
of the productivity distribution to ensure that 20% of the largest home rms account for 60% of the total
home-rm sales. We set {φi} so that the average home rm’s exposure to foreign inputs is φ̄D = 0.2,
and the correlation between φi and Si across home rms within industries is 0.3, as in our data. This
results in the average import intensity of 0.25 for the largest 20% of rms and 0.125 for the remaining
small rms. Finally, we choose the number of foreign rms so that they account for 20% of the domestic
market sales and set φ∗ ≡ 0.7, to match the foreign rms’ ERPT into export prices of about 50%.
Table 7 shows how the calibrated model with CES demand and Cournot competition accurately
matches our empirical estimates from Section 3. Indeed, the model captures nearly complete cost pass-
through and zero strategic complementarities typical of the small rms, and strong strategic comple-
mentarities and incomplete own cost pass-through exhibited by the large rms. As a result, the model
is capable of reproducing the empirical patterns of markup elasticities across rms {Γi}, and it is cali-
brated to match the variation in market shares and import intensities {Si, φi}, providing the necessary
ingredients for a counterfactual analysis of exchange rate depreciations.
Table 8 reports the eects of a 10% home currency depreciation on costs, markups and prices across
various subsets of rms. We nd that a depreciation leads to a fall in the aggregate industry markup,
with the average pass-through into home prices Ψ=0.24, below the pass-through into costs ϕ̄ = 0.3.
That is, markup adjustment attenuates the aggregate pass-through into domestic prices by about 20%.
This underscores the quantitative relevance of Proposition 3 and Corollary 2. Furthermore, the cali-
brated model predicts a decline in the markups of the home rms on average, with the fall in the large
rms’ markups more than osetting the increase in the small rms’ markups. We further illustrate this
heterogeneity in the markup adjustment across rms of dierent size in the Appendix Figure A2. We
reach similar conclusions in an alternative quantitative model with Kimball demand and monopolistic
competition (see Appendix D and, in particular, Appendix Table A4).
Finally, our modeling approach can be used to analyze alternative counterfactual industries to de-
termine the direction of aggregate markup adjustment in response to a variety of international shocks.
In general, relative to the baseline case, aggregate markups fall by a larger amount in industries with
less direct foreign competition in the output market and more import-intensive large domestic rms.
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The opposite case, where the presence of strategic complementarities leads to an increase in the aggregate markup,
obtains if the small rms were relatively more exposed to the international shock than large rms. However, the selection of
the large rms into importing makes this alternative case unlikely in practice.
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Indeed, the exposure of the large domestic rms to the foreign shocks through the imported inputs
channel is key for the downward aggregate markup adjustment in the home market and the muted
response of the home price level. This result highlights how the channel by which foreign value added
reaches the home market aects the extent of the aggregate markup adjustment. In industries where
foreign competition in the output market is high and imported input intensities are low, aggregate
markup adjustment is close to zero as the increase in the domestic rms’ markups osets the decline
in the foreign rms’ markups. In contrast, in industries with high imported input intensities and low
foreign competition, the large domestic rms also reduce their markups leading to a decline in the ag-
gregate markup, provided the heterogeneity in strategic complementarities is positively correlated with
the import intensities. In this case, the greater the heterogeneity, the stronger the markup adjustment
and the lower is the pass-through into the domestic price level.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a direct estimate of strategic complementarities in price setting. We nd that a
rm increases its price by an average of 4% in response to a 10% increase in the prices of its competitors,
holding its own marginal cost constant, and thus due entirely to the markup adjustment. Furthermore,
there is considerable heterogeneity in the strength of strategic complementarities across rms. Small
rms show no strategic complementarities and a complete pass-through of their cost shocks into prices,
in line with constant-markup pricing behavior, as is characteristic of monopolistic competitors under
CES demand. In contrast, large rms exhibit strong strategic complementarities and incomplete pass-
through. We estimate these elasticities within a general theoretical framework, using a new rich micro
dataset with information on rm marginal costs and competitor prices. We develop an instrumental
variable identication strategy to estimate the properties of rm markups without imposing strong
structural assumptions on demand, competition or production.
These results have important implications for the aggregate markup response to international
shocks. Interestingly, the presence of strategic complementarities per se at the micro-level is not su-
cient to generate movements in aggregate markups. If the strategic complementarity elasticity is the
same across all rms, an international shock results in zero aggregate markup adjustments irrespec-
tive of the strength of strategic complementarities. In particular, the fall in foreign rms’ markups is
exactly oset by the rise in domestic markups, or vice versa. A novel nding from our analysis is that
heterogeneity in markup elasticities across rms is necessary for any aggregate markup adjustment.
We show that an exchange rate depreciation in a typical Belgian manufacturing industry, where large
rms import a substantial share of their intermediate inputs, results in a fall in aggregate markups. In
this case, the large domestic rms, in fact, decrease their markups, thereby attenuating the aggregate
exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices.
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A Additional Empirical and Quantitative Results
Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable 5 pctl Mean Median 95 pctl St.dev.
Firm-product
∆pit −0.363 0.013 0.003 0.400 0.235
variables
∆p−it −0.061 0.012 0.008 0.093 0.054
Sit 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.044 0.039
Lit 9.9 168.9 36.1 666.8 515.1
Firm-level
∆mcit −0.262 0.022 0.015 0.330 0.212
variables
∆mc∗it −0.030 0.002 0.000 0.041 0.029
φit 0.000 0.148 0.109 0.452 0.156
φXit 0.000 0.032 0.003 0.168 0.071
maxi∈D Sit 0.013 0.098 0.063 0.313 0.110
Industry-level
∑
i∈D Sit 0.111 0.565 0.588 0.901 0.238
variables
∑
i∈F Sit 0.080 0.369 0.315 0.864 0.236
(NACE 4-digit)
∑
i∈X Sit 0.003 0.092 0.066 0.273 0.090
# of rms 6 65 40 310 80
Fraction of rms with φit (or φ
X
it )>0 Average across rms
All Large Small All Large Small
φit 0.701 0.984 0.638 0.150 0.221 0.134
φXit 0.576 0.958 0.491 0.032 0.059 0.026
Notes: The table reports percentiles, means and standard deviations of the main variables used in the analysis, as dened in
the text. Additionally: Lit denotes rm employment; φit and φ
X
it are the rm expenditure shares (in total variable costs) on
foreign intermediate inputs from outside Belgium and from outside the eurozone, respectively;D, F andX correspond to the
sets of domestic, all foreign and foreign non-eurozone rms, respectively. The statistics characterize our sample distributions
across observations, which are at the rm-product-year level, except the ‘# of rms’, which is at the industry-year level.
The lower panel reports averages across rm-year observations; Large (Small) rms are based on the average employment
cuto of 100 employees, as in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.
Table A2: Robustness: large and small rms
Sample Large rms Small rms
Export share < 0.1 FDI share < 0.005 φi > 0 φ
X
i > 0















(0.187) (0.188) (0.202) (0.211)
# obs. 7,941 14,389 32,984 25,900
Notes: Large and small sample based on employment≷100 threshold, as in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. Column 1 only
includes large rms with the share of export in total sales less than 10%. Column 2 only includes large rms with related-
party foreign sales or purchases less than 0.005% of their total sales. Column 3 and 4 only include rms with positive imports
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Figure A1: Cost pass-through and strategic complementarity elasticities for dierent employment-size cutos
Note: The gure reports the results for rms with average employment below the following 8 cutos: 100, 200, 300, 400,
500, 600, 1,000, and 8,500 (corresponding to the full sample). The left panel reports the fraction of observations and domestic
sales accounted for by the rms below each of the employment cutos, illustrating the very skewed rm-size distribution in
the data. The right panel re-estimates the specication in column 1 of Table 2 under dierent employment cutos, and plots
the estimated elasticities α̂ and γ̂ (and the respective 95% condence intervals) against the shares of sales accounted for by the
rms in each subsample (corresponds to the red solid line in the left gure). Note that the very rst (left) points correspond
to the estimates in column 1 of Table 2, while the very last (right) points to those in column 4 of Table 1.
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Figure A2: ERPT and markup adjustment, by size bins of home rms
Note: Simulated currency depreciation counterfactual, as in Table 8. The gure plots average ERPT (ΨJ , blue bars) by bins
of home rms based on within-industry market shares, as well as the markup adjustment (ΨJ − ϕ̄J , red bars), and the
dierence between the two is the direct cost shock (ϕ̄J ). As in the Belgian data, rms with less than 1% market shares within
their industries account for almost 60% of the count of rms, but less than 20% of domestic-rm home market sales; the bin
of the largest rms with more than 10% market shares account for 2% of rm count and almost 20% of home market sales.
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B Data Appendix
Data Sources The production data (PRODCOM) report production values and quantities at the rm-
product level in the manufacturing sector, where the product is dened at the PC 8-digit. It is a survey
of all rms with a minimum of 10 employees, covering at least 90% of production in each NACE 4-
digit (that is, the rst 4 digits of the PC 8-digit code), which includes around 1,700 manufacturing
product codes in any one year. We only keep PC codes that are classied as manufactured goods -
these are products for which the rst 4-digits of the PC8 codes are in the range of 1500 to 3699. We
drop all PC8 codes in petroleum (NACE 2-digit code 23) and industrial services. Firms are required
to report total values and quantities but are not required to report the breakdown between domestic
and exports. Therefore, to get a measure of domestic values and quantities we merge on the export
data from customs and subtract total export values and quantities from total production values and
quantities sold. One complication in constructing domestic sales is the issue of carry-along-trade (see
Bernard, Blanchard, Van Beveren, and Vandenbussche 2012), arising when rms export products that
they do not themselves produce. To address this issue we drop all observations for which exports of a
rm in period t are greater than 95% of production sold (dropping 11% of the observations and 15% of
revenues, which amounts to a much lower share of domestic value sold since most of these revenues
come from exports).
The international data comprise transactions on intra-EU trade data collected by the Intrastat In-
quiry and the extra-EU transactions data by Customs. These data are reported at the rm level by
destination and source country for each product classied at the 8-digit combined nomenclature (CN)
in values and quantities, with around 10,000 distinct products. The rst 6-digits of the CN codes cor-
respond to the World Harmonized System (HS). All transactions that involve a change of "ownership
with compensation" (codes 1 and 11) are in our sample. These data include all extra-EU transactions
of rms with trade greater than 1,000 euros or whose weights are more than 1,000 kilograms - these
thresholds were reduced in 2006; and intra-EU trade with a higher threshold of 250,000 euros, with both
these thresholds raised somewhat in 2006.
The rm characteristics data are available on an annual frequency at the rm level, with each rm
reporting their main economic activity within a 5-digit NACE industry. However, there is no product
level data within rms available from this source.
Merging the trade and production data The production and trade data are easily merged using a
unique rm identier. But the merging of the rm’s products in the production and customs data is a
bit more complicated.
First, we had to aggregate the monthly PRODCOM data to the annual frequency. To avoid large
jumps in annual values due to nonreporting for some months by some rms, we only keep a rm’s
observation in year t if there was positive production reported for at least one product in each month.
In some cases the rm reported positive values but the quantities were missing. For these cases, in order
to construct domestic unit values we impute the quantity sold from the average value to quantity ratio in
the months where both values and quantities were reported - this only aected 3% of the observations,
accounting for 1% of the production value. With this adjustment, we aggregated the data to the annual
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level.
Second, there is the task of converting the highly disaggregated trade data that is at the CN 8-
digit level with the more aggregated PC 8-digit PC codes. To match these two datasets, we use the
concordance provided by Eurostat - these mappings may be one-to-one, many-to-one, one-to-many,
or many-to-many. We use the les developed by Van Beveren, Bernard, and Vandenbussche (2012) to
identify these mappings. While CN-to-PC conversion is straightforward for one-to-one and many-to-
one mappings, conversion for one-to-many and many-to-many mappings required grouping of some
PC codes. There were 77 such groupings, which account for approximately 4% of the observations and
production value.
Third, in order to construct the domestic unit values, where we net out exports from total production
values and quantities, we need to ensure that the quantities in the two datasets are comparable. So we
drop observations where the units that match in the two datasets are less than 95% of the total export
value and the rm’s export share is greater than 5% within a rm-PC-year observation. The rationale for
doing this is that if the export share (exports as a ratio of production) is really small then the domestic
unit value won’t be aected very much if we don’t subtract all of the rm’s exports.
Fourth, some PC codes change over time. Here, we only make an adjustment if the code is a one-to-
one change between two years. We do not take into account changes in PC codes that involve splitting
into multiple codes or multiple PC codes combining into one code. Eectively, these changes in the PC
codes are treated as though they are new products.
C Derivations and Proofs














})∣∣∣ s.t h−i(pi,p−i; ξ) = 0}, (A1)
where pi and qi are log price and log quantity demanded of the rm, TCi(·) is the total cost function (in
levels), and h−i(·) is the conjectural variation vector function with elements given by hij(·) for j 6= i;
we omit t subscript for brevity. Note that this formulation nests monopolistic competition, oligopolistic
Bertrand competition, and oligopolistic Cournot competition, as long as the demand system is invert-
ible. In particular, to capture rm behavior under monopolistic and oligopolistic Bertrand competition,
we choose the conjectural variation function:
h−i(pi,p−i; ξ) = p−i − p∗−i. (A2)
Indeed, this corresponds to the assumption of the rm that its price choice pi leads to no adjustment
in the prices of its competitors which are set at p−i = p
∗
−i. The case of Cournot competition requires
choosing h−i(·) such that it implies q−i ≡ q∗−i for some given q∗−i vector. Provided an invertible
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demand system, this can be simply ensured by choosing:









Therefore, we can capture the rm behavior under competition in both prices and quantities with a
conditional prot maximization with respect to prices (A1). The analysis can be generalized beyond
the cases in (A2)–(A3) by considering a general dierentiable function h−i(·).
We introduce the following notation:
1. epi+qiλij for j 6= i is the set of Lagrange multipliers for the constraints in (A1);
2. ζijk(p; ξ) ≡ ∂hij(p; ξ)/∂pk is the elasticity of the conjectural variation function, with ζijj(·) > 0
as a normalization and the matrix {ζijk(·)}j,k 6=i having full rank, which is trivially the case
for (A2) and is satised for (A3) due to the assumption of demand invertibility;
3. εi(p; ξ) ≡ −∂qi(p; ξ)/pi > 0 and δij(p; ξ) ≡ ∂qi(p; ξ)/pj for j 6= i are the own and cross price
elasticities of demand.
We can then write the rst-order conditions for (A1), after simplication, as:
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where µi ≡ pi − mci is the log markup and mci ≡ log(∂TCi/∂Qi) is the log marginal cost. Using






where σi is the perceived elasticity of demand given by (using vector notation):
σi ≡ εi − ζ′iZ−1i δi, (A5)
where ζi ≡ {ζiji}j 6=i and δi ≡ {δij}j 6=i are (N − 1)× 1 vectors and Zi ≡ {ζijk}j 6=i,k 6=i is (N − 1)×
(N −1) matrix of cross-price elasticities, which has full rank (under the market competition structures
we consider) due to the demand invertibility assumption.
Recall that ζijk, εi and δij are all functions of (p; ξ), and therefore σi ≡ σi(p; ξ). Consequently,
(A4) denes the log markup function:




and the optimal price of the rm solves the following xed point equation:
p̃i =Mi(p̃i,p−i; ξ) +mci
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completing the proof of Proposition 1. 
We can now discuss a number of special cases. First, in the case of monopolistic competition and
oligopolistic price (Bertrand) competition, for which the conjecture function satises (A2), and there-
fore ζijj ≡ 1, ζiji = 0 for j 6= i and ζijk ≡ 0 for k 6= j, i. This implies thatZi is an identity matrix and
ζi ≡ 0, substituting which into (A5) results in:




In words, the perceived elasticity of demand in this case simply equals the partial price elasticity of the
residual demand of the rm.
In the case of oligopolistic quantity (Cournot) competition, we have ζijk = εj for k = j and
ζijk = −δjk for j 6= k. Therefore, in this case we can rewrite (A5) as:
σi = εi(p; ξ)−
∑
j 6=i
δij(p; ξ)κij(p; ξ), (A7)



















dpk = 0 for all j 6= i in matrix





Proof of Proposition 2 If qi = qi(pi, z; ξ), then following the same steps as above, we can show that
there exists a markup function:
µi =Mi(pi, z; ξ) ≡ log
σi(pi, z; ξ)
σi(pi, z; ξ)− 1
,
such that the prot-maximizing price of the rm solves p̃i = mci +Mi(p̃i, z; ξ). Using the denition




k 6=i ∂Mi(pi, z; ξ)/∂pk
=
∂Mi(pi, z; ξ)/∂z · Sj







where we make use of Shephard’s lemma (Envelope condition) for the log expenditure function ∂z/∂pj = Sj
and
∑
k 6=i Sk = 1− Si. Consequently, the competitor price index is given by (8).
If a stronger condition σi = σi(pi − z; ξ) is satised, then:
µi =Mi(pi − z; ξ) ≡ log
σi(pi − z; ξ)
σi(pi − z; ξ)− 1
,
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and, using the denitions of Γi and Γ−i in (5), we have:
Γi = −
dMi(pi − z; ξ)
dpi
= −∂Mi(pi − z; ξ)
∂pi










∂Mi(pi − z; ξ)
∂pj
=





This completes the proof of the proposition. 
Note that condition in (ii) in the proposition is stronger than the condition in (i). For example, when
σi(p; ξ) = −∂qi(p; ξ)/∂pi, we have that σi = σi(pi − z; ξ) implies qi = qi(pi, z; ξ). The converse is
not true, e.g. if qi(pi, z; ξ) is not homothetic of degree one in the levels of (pi, z).
Derivations for oligopolistic competition under CES demand Instead of following the standard ap-
proach, we derive the results for the Atkeson-Burstein model using the more general Propositions 1
and 2, and their proofs above. We write the nested CES demand schedule in logs:
qi = log ξi + ds + (ρ− η)z − ρpi, (A8)
where η ≥ 1 and ρ > η are the elasticities of substitution across industries and within-industry across





is the industry demand shifter, where $s is the exogenous
shifter, Y is the nominal income in the economy and P is the log aggregate price index, and no rm
is large enough to aect Y and P ; nally, z = ps is the log expenditure function equal to the industry







exp{log ξi + (1− ρ)pi}. (A9)
Shephard’s lemma can be veried to hold for z directly from (A9):
∂z
∂pi





where the second equality uses demand equation (A8) and the last equality is the denition of the
revenue market share Si. Furthermore, we can use this result to decompose the change in the industry











which corresponds to the index of competitor price changes in (8).
We now calculate σi for both cases of Bertrand and Cournot competition:
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In fact, in this case, such decomposition is also available for the level of the price index, which is a special property in
















1. Price competition (Bertrand) Recall from (A6) that under Bertrand competition, we simply




= ρ− (ρ− η)elog ξi+(1−ρ)(pi−z),
and therefore the conditions for both parts of Proposition 2 apply in this case. We rewrite:
εi = ρ− (ρ− η)Si = ρ(1− Si) + ηSi. (A10)
Taking stock, we have εi = ε(pi − z; ξi) given the parameters of the model (ρ, η), and
µi =Mi(pi − z; ξi) = log
ε(pi − z; ξi)
ε(pi − z; ξi)− 1
.















· (1− Si) = Γi.
In the case of Cobb-Douglas industry aggregator (η = 1), this simplies to Γi = Γ−i =
(ρ−1)Si
1+(ρ−1)(1−Si) ,
which is monotonically increasing in Si.
2. Quantity competition (Cournot) Next consider the case of Cournot competition. Here we









= (ρ− η)Sj and ζijk =
[
εj = ρ− (ρ− η)Sj , if k = j,
−δjk = −(ρ− η)Sj , if k 6= j.
We could directly use this to solve for ζ′iZ
−1





the elements are κij = dpj/dpi
∣∣
dqk=0,k 6=i
. We do this by noting that:
dqj = (ρ− η)dz − ρdpj = 0, j 6= i,












ρ− (ρ− η)(1− Si)
,
and the expressions for κij = dpj/dpi = (ρ − η)Si/[ρ − (ρ − η)(1 − Si)] for all j 6= i follow.
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Substituting this into (A7), we have:
σi = εi −
∑
j 6=i
δijκij = [ρ− (ρ− η)Si]−
(ρ− η)2Si























replicating (11), which is the conventional expression from Atkeson and Burstein (2008). Again,
we have σi = σi(pi−z; ξi) and µi =Mi(pi−z, ξi) = log σi(pi−z;ξi)σi(pi−z;ξi)−1 , satisfying the conditions
in both parts of Proposition 2. The remaining derivation of the expression for Γi = Γ−i parallels
that in the case of the Bertrand competition above, and results in expressions (12) in the text.
Note the qualitative similarity between the price and quantity oligopolistic competition, where in the
former σi is a simple average of ρ and η with a weight Si on ρ, and in the latter σi is a corresponding
harmonic average, with the same monotonicity properties, given the values of ρ and η. In both cases,
Γi = Γ−i = Γ(Si), which is a monotonically increasing function of Si at least on Si ∈ [0, 0.5] for any
values of the parameters.
Reduced-form of the model We start with the price decomposition (4) and, under the assumptions of
















where we used the decomposition dpt =
∑N
j=1 Sjtdpjt = (1−Sit)dp−it +Sitdpit. Aggregating (A11)























































which we can simplify to
dpit = aitdmcit + bitdmc−it + ε̃it, (A13)
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This illustrates the complexity of interpreting the coecients ait and bit of the reduced form of the
model, as well as calculating an appropriate competitor marginal cost index, even in the special case
when Proposition 2 applies.
Estimating the reduced form in equation (A13) requires measures of the full marginal cost for all
rms in order to construct ∆mc−it, whereas we only have comprehensive measures of marginal costs
available for the domestic competitors. While this would constitute an omitted variable bias in (A13),
it is not a problem for estimating the rm’s best response (13), which only requires an instrument for
the full index of competitor price changes ∆p−it, which we can construct in the data. Furthermore, the
coecients αit and γit in (13) have a clear structural interpretation, and a direct relationship with the
rm’s markup elasticities Γit and Γ−it. These coecients have an appealing sucient statistic property
for describing the micro-level and aggregate responses to various shocks, such as an exchange rate
shock that we consider in Section 4. In contrast, the reduced-form coecients ait and bit compound
the industry equilibrium eects, and are thus much less tractable for structural interpretation.
Proof of Proposition 3 Assume the conditions of Proposition 2 are satised, so that Γ−it = Γit and
dpt =
∑N








Provided the denition of Ψ−it and Ψit in the text, we can rewrite:
ψit =
1
1 + Γit/(1− Sit)
ϕit +
Γit/(1− Sit)
1 + Γit/(1− Sit)
Ψt,
which corresponds to equation (25) in the text with κit ≡ Γit1−Sit+Γit . Weighting by Sit and aggregating,









1 + Γit/(1− Sit)
ϕit,




1+Γjt/(1−Sjt) = 1 −
∑N
j=1 Sjtκjt,
conrming the claim in Proposition 3. 
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Aggregate ERPT and markup response with three types of rms Consider a simple stylized example
with three types of rms, which captures the essence of a more sophisticated quantitative model in
Section 4.2. In particular, we study an industry with small and large home rms, as well as large foreign
rms exporting into the home market. We index the three types of rms with S, L and F , respectively.
All rms are small relative to the market, so thatN →∞ and Sit → 0 for all i. The cumulative market
share of the small and large home rms is λS and λL, respectively, and the rest of the market is served
by the foreign rms with λF = 1− λS − λL.
To capture in a stylized way the salient features of heterogeneity observed in the Belgian data, we
make the following assumptions. The small and large home rms dier in import intensity and markup
elasticity, with ϕS = ΓS = 0, reecting that small rms do not rely on imported inputs and exhibit
constant-markup behavior. In contrast, the large home rms have ϕL = ϕ > 0 and ΓL = Γ > 0.
Lastly, the foreign rms have ϕF = ϕ
∗ > ϕ, and ΓF = Γ, capturing the Melitz (2003) selection eect
of the largest rms into exporting. The results below also hold for any ΓF ≥ Γ.
For our baseline case, we set the foreign share λF = 0.2, and λS = λL = 0.4, so that the small and
large home rms split equally the remaining home market. This approximates a typical Belgian man-
ufacturing industry in our sample. We further set ϕ = 0.4 and Γ = 1.5 for the large home rms. This
implies an own cost pass-through,
1
1+Γ , of 70% on average for home rms, with a 100% pass-through for
small rms and a 40% pass-through for large rms, capturing in a stylized way our empirical ndings
in Section 3. For the foreign rms, we set ϕ∗ = 0.7, implying that 30% of foreign exporters’ production
expenditure is on intermediates purchased from the eurozone. Altogether, the share of foreign value
added in aggregate output is given by ϕ̄ = λLϕ+λFϕ
∗ = 0.3, where a portion λFϕ
∗ = 0.14 comes in
the form of foreign output and a portion λLϕ = 0.16 comes in the form of foreign intermediates used
by the large home rms, broadly in line with the Belgian patterns documented by Tintelnot, Kikkawa,
Mogstad, and Dhyne (2017).
Using the general result in Proposition 3, we can characterize the aggregate ERPT and study its





and therefore Ψ < ϕ̄ if λSΓ > 0. Indeed, in this simple example, λSΓ > 0 ensures that the conditions
of Corollary 2 are satised, while whenever λS = 0 or Γ = 0, the conditions of Corollary 1 are satised
instead. This illustrates how the presence of small rms that dier from large rms in terms of both
exchange rate exposure ϕ and strategic complementarities Γ is essential for the aggregate markup
adjustment. The larger is the cumulative market share of the small rms λS , the bigger is the gap
between ϕ̄ and Ψ. This is because the prices of the small rms are not sensitive to the exchange rate,
and this acts to limit the price adjustment by the large rms that exhibit strategic complementarities.
In our baseline, the average exchange rate pass-through into costs is ϕ̄ = 0.3, while the average pass-
through into prices is Ψ = 0.19 < ϕ̄. In other words, markup adjustment at the industry level osets
almost 40% of the direct eect of the shock to the marginal cost. This also means that in response to a
10% depreciation, the average industry markup declines by more than one percentage point.
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We evaluate the markup adjustment by the subset of the domestic rms. WithψS =ϕS =0, we have:
ΨD − ϕ̄D =
λL
λS + λL

























1+ΓΨ using (A14). Therefore, a necessary and sucient condition for the markup
of the home rms to decline on average is ϕ > ϕ̄/(1+λSΓ). Evidently, this is more likely to be the case
when strategic complementarities are strong, large home rms rely intensively on foreign inputs, and
also face relatively more small domestic competitors than foreign competitors (which reduces ϕ̄). In our
baseline, ϕ̄D = 0.2 and ΨD = 0.14 < ϕ̄D , suggesting a considerable reduction in home rms’ average
markups in response to an exchange rate depreciation. This contrasts with the conventional narrative
whereby domestic rms increase markups in response to a depreciation. In our example, small domestic
rms are not exposed to the exchange rate directly and do not adjust their markups, as they exhibit no
strategic complementarities in price setting. The large home rms are, in contrast, strongly exposed to
the exchange rate directly, as they import a considerable portion of their inputs. And, since these large
home rms compete most intensely against the small home rms (as the cumulative share of foreign
rm is only 20%), strategic complementarities compel the large home rms to reduce their markups.
Our conclusion that depreciations lead to lower average markups of the home rms, while contra-
dicting the conventional logic, is rather robust under a variety of alternative scenarios. There are two
essential requirements for this to happen. First, a considerable portion of foreign value added in the sec-
tor must come not just in the form of output, but also in the form of intermediate inputs, used primarily
by the largest home producers. Second, as emphasized in Corollary 2, rms must exhibit dierential
degrees of strategic complementarity in price setting, which is correlated with the exposure to foreign
value added. This heterogeneity requirement is, however, not implausibly stringent. In this three-type
economy, ΨD < ϕ̄D still holds true even if we reduce considerably the extent of heterogeneity between
small and large home rms, relative to our highly stylized example with ϕS = ΓS = 0. Therefore, we
conclude that our nding that domestic rms reduce their markups on average in response to a home
currency depreciation is not merely a curiosity, but indeed a likely empirical outcome.
D General Quantitative Model
Monopolistic competition under CES demand yields constant markups. In this appendix we relax both
assumptions, allowing for general non-CES homothetic demand and oligopolistic competition. This
model nests both Kimball (1995) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008).











where Ω is the set of products i in the sector with N = |Ω| denoting the number of goods, and Ci is
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the consumption of product i; Ai and ξi denote the two shifters (a quality parameter and a demand
parameter, respectively); Υ(·) is the demand function such that Υ(·) > 0,Υ′(·) > 0,Υ′′(·) < 0, and
Υ(1) = 1. The two important limiting cases are N → ∞ (corresponding to Kimball monopolistic
competition) and Υ(z) = z(σ−1)/σ (corresponding to the CES aggregator).
Consumers allocate expenditure E to the purchase of products in the sector, and we assume that
E = kP 1−η , where P is the sectoral price index and η is the elasticity of substitution across sectors
(and k is a sectoral demand shifter exogenous to the within-sector equilibrium outcomes). Formally,
we write the sectoral expenditure (budget) constraint as:∑
i∈Ω
PiCi = E. (A16)
Given prices {Pi}i∈Ω of all products in the sector and expenditure E, consumers allocate consumption






s.t. (A15) and (A16)
}
. (A17)








where χi ≡ Ai/ξi is the quality parameter and ψ(·) ≡ Υ′−1(·) is the demand curve, while ξiC/N is the
normalized demand shifter.
54 C is sectoral consumption; P is the ideal price index such that C = E/P
(hence, P is also the expenditure function) and D is an additional auxiliary variable determined in
industry equilibrium, which is needed to characterize demand outside the CES case.
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Substituting the demand schedule (A18) into the constraints (A15)–(A16), we obtain a system of

























The rst condition in (A19) ensures that (A15) is satised given the demand (A18), i.e. that C is indeed
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Note that an increase in χi directly reduces the eective price for the good in the eyes of the consumers, which corre-
sponds to a shift along the demand curve. At the same time, an increase in ξi (holding χi constant), shifts out the demand
curve holding the eective price unchanged. This is why we refer to ξi as the demand shifter, and χi as the quality parameter.
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Note that the ideal price index P exists since the demand dened by (A15) is homothetic, i.e. a proportional increase inE
holding all {Pi} constant results in a proportional expansion in C and in all {Ci} holding their ratios constant; 1/P equals
the Lagrange multiplier for the maximization problem in (A17) on the expenditure constraint (A16).
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In the limiting case of CES, we have Υ(z) = z
σ−1








this into (A19) and taking the ratio of the two conditions immediately pins down the value of D = (σ − 1)/σ, which
is a constant independent from {Pj}. Hence, this auxiliary variable is redundant in the CES case given the value of the












. The case of CES is a knife-edge case in which the demand system can be described
with only the price index P , which summarizes all information contained in micro-level prices needed to describe aggregate
allocation. More generally, the second auxiliary variable D is needed to characterize the aggregate eects of micro-level
heterogeneity. In fact, (P,D) form a sucient statistic to describe the relevant moments of the price distribution.
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attained given the consumption allocation {Ci}. The second condition in (A19) ensures that the ex-
penditure constraint (A16) is satised given the allocation (A18). Note that this condition simply states













where we substituted in for Ci from the demand equation (A18).
Next, we introduce the demand elasticity as a characteristic of the slope of the demand curve ψ(·):




where xi is the eective price of the rm as dened in (A18). Outside the CES case, the demand elasticity















Note that the elasticity of demand in this model depends on xi = (Pi/χi)/(P/D), and hence P/D
is the sucient statistic for competitor prices, albeit one that diers from the expenditure function P .












j∈Ω Sjσj . Therefore, log(P/D) and logP dier by a second order term in the cross-
sectional dispersion of xi, and hence Proposition 2 applies as a rst-order approximation. We verify
the precision of this approximation using our calibrated Kimball demand model.
We can now calculate the full eective elasticity of demand, which takes into account the eects of
Pi on P and D. Substituting C = E/P = kP
−η










which generalizes expression (A10) in the CES case, and also nests the expression for the monopolistic
competition case where Si ≡ 0. In the general case, the optimal prot-maximizing markup is given by
Σi/(Σi − 1), and it can be analyzed in the same way we approached it in Section 2.
The key insight is that the market share channel in (A22) operates exactly in the same way as in
the CES model described in Section 2. In the CES model (with σi ≡ ρ for all i), however, this is the
only channel of markup variability: as the rm gains market share, it increases its markup (as long as
ρ > η), and markups become atter as all rms become smaller in absolute terms, with the limiting
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case of monopolistic competition and constant markups. More generally, with non-CES demand, the
markup elasticity also depends on the properties of the σ(·) function in (A21), and markups are non-
constant even in the limiting case of monopolistic competition with Si ≡ 0, where the variables that
aect the curvature of demand (namely, σ′(·)) determine the variability of the markup. Nonetheless, as
long as η < σi, an increase in market share Si leads to a reduction in the eective elasticity of demand
Σi, emphasizing the general role the market share plays across oligopolistic models. Furthermore, in
the limit of monopolistic competition, non-CES demand can exhibits similar qualitative properties of
markup variation as the oligopolistic model under CES demand (see e.g. Gopinath and Itskhoki 2010).
Calibration of the CES model We solve for an industry equilibrium in the domestic market, in which
both domestic and foreign rms (exporters) compete together, and the costs of the rms follow exoge-
nous processes disciplined by the data. We analyze simultaneous price setting by rms that are subject
to idiosyncratic cost shocks and an aggregate exchange rate shock, aecting rms with heterogeneous
intensities. We calibrate the model using data on “typical” Belgian manufacturing industries at NACE
4–digit level of aggregation.




t D, where D is an exogenous
demand shifter and Pt is the sectoral price index, as dened under equation (11) in Section 2. The
strategic complementarities in price setting arising due to oligopolistic (quantity) competition under
CES demand, following Atkeson and Burstein (2008). This model has a number of desirable properties
for our analysis. First, this model, combined with a realistic rm productivity process described below,
delivers the empirically accurate fat-tailed distribution of rm market revenues (Zipf’s law). Second,
rms with larger market shares charge higher markups and adjust them more intensively in response
to shocks, exhibiting greater strategic complementarities in price setting, as we discussed in the text.
Third, the model reproduces a large mass of very small rms that charge nearly constant markups
and exhibit no strategic complementarities, being eectively monopolistic competitors under constant-
elasticity demand. All this is in line with the empirical patterns we document in Section 3.
The empirical success of the Atkeson-Burstein model in matching the rm price behavior relies
on the assumptions of Cournot competition and particular values of demand elasticities. We set the
elasticity of substitution across 4-digit industries to η = 1 (corresponding to the Cobb-Douglas ag-
gregator) and within 4-digit industries to ρ = 10. This is a conventional calibration in the literature
following Atkeson and Burstein (2008), as for example in Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015). In order to
reproduce empirical pass-through patterns, the model requires a combination of Cournot competition,
a low (eectively Cobb-Douglas) between-industry elasticity and a high within-industry elasticity of
demand. Under our baseline parameterization, the largest rm in a typical industry with a market share
of 12% has a cost pass-through elasticity of around 0.5, and correspondingly a 0.5 strategic complemen-
tarity elasticity, as in this model Γ−it = Γit. This ensures the model replicates the empirical patterns
documented in Section 3, as we illustrated in Table 7 in the text. Any signicant departure from this
parameterization (towards higher η, lower ρ, or to Bertrand competition) results in a steep drop in the
extent of strategic complementarities Γit, as can be seen in Figure A3, and would lead to the model’s
failure in matching the observed empirical patterns.
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Figure A3: Markups and pass-through in a calibrated model
Note: Solid blue line corresponds to our benchmark case with Cournot competition, ρ = 10 and η = 1. The other lines
correspond to respective departures from the baseline case. Left panel plots markupsMit and right panel plots cost pass-
through elasticity 1/(1+Γit), both as functions of the rm’s market share Sit (see expressions in Section 2). In the data, the
market share of the largest rm in a typical industry is around 12%, depicted with a vertical dashed line in the right panel.
The marginal costs of the rms are given by (27), where the price index of domestic inputs Wt and
the foreign-currency price index of imported inputs V ∗t are assumed to be common across rms within
an industry. We assume {Wt, V ∗t , Et} follow exogenous processes, reecting our industry equilibrium
focus. In particular, we normalize Wt ≡ V ∗t ≡ 1, making Et the only source of aggregate shocks,
which aects rms with heterogeneous intensity φi. The nominal exchange rate follows a random
walk in logs:
et = et−1 + σeut, ut ∼ iid N (0, 1), (A23)
where et ≡ log Et and σe = 0.06 is the standard deviation of the exchange rate innovation, calibrate to
match the volatility of the annual trade-weighted euro exchange rate in the data.
We further assume that rm productivitiesAit follow a random growth process, with ait ≡ logAit
evolving according to a random walk with drift µ and a lower reecting barrier at a:
ait = a+ |µ+ ai,t−1 + σavit − a|, vit ∼ iid N (0, 1) (A24)
where σa is the standard deviation of the innovation to log productivity. The initial productivities
Ai0 are drawn from a Pareto distribution with the cumulative distribution function G0(A) = 1 −(
ea/A
)θ
, where θ is the shape parameter and a is the lower bound parameter. We set µ = −θσ2a/2 < 0
to ensure that the cross-sectional distribution of productivities stays unchanged over time and given
by G0 (see Gabaix 2009). We normalize a = 0, and we set σa = 0.03 to match the short-run and
long-run persistence of rm market shares (namely, the cross-sectional standard deviation of ∆Sit
and correlation of Sit and Si,t+12). Finally, we set the shape parameter of the Pareto productivity
distribution θ = 8, which (in combination with the demand elasticity ρ = 8) reproduces simultaneously
the Zipf’s law in rm sales within industries and the size of the largest rm across industries, as well
as the overall measures of rm concentration. In particular, we ensure that the 20% of the largest rm
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account for 60% of the home-market sales, as is the case in the data.
Each industry has domestic and foreign rms, with productivities drawn from the same data gen-
erating process. We set the number of domestic rms to 45 and select the number (of top) foreign rms
to match the 20% sales share, corresponding to a typical Belgian manufacturing industry. All foreign
rms have the same exposure to foreign inputs φi = φ
∗ = 0.7, reecting that 30% of their costs come
from within the eurozone, and allowing us to match the average exchange rate pass-through into Bel-
gian imports of around 50% (see Table 8). For the domestic rms, we have φi ∈ [0, φ∗], positively, yet
imperfectly, correlated with rm productivity Ait, to match the empirical correlation between φit and
Sit of 0.3, with the sale-weighted average of import intensity given by φ̄ = 0.2.
To calculate the moments in the model, we simulate a large number of industries (10,000) over
13 years, generating a panel of rm marginal costs, prices and market shares, akin to the one we have
for the Belgian manufacturing sector. The equilibrium prices are a result of the oligopolistic price set-
ting game in the industry, following (11). For a general equilibrium analysis and a formal estimation of
a related model see Gaubert and Itskhoki (2018). We use this simulated dataset to produce the counter-
factual results in Tables 7 and 8 in the text.
Calibration of thenon-CES (Kimball)model As an alternative quantitative model of variable markups,
we consider a monopolistic competition model under non-CES demand. Specically, we adopt the
Klenow and Willis (2016) formulation of the Kimball (1995) demand, given by the following demand



































Therefore, for ε > 0, this demand features an increasing elasticity of demand with the rm’s price, and
hence a decreasing markup given by
σ̃(xi)
σ̃(xi)−1 . The limiting case with ε → 0 corresponds to the CES
demand with a constant elasticity σ.
The elasticity of the markup with respect to both Pi and price index P is given by:













is decreasing in the price of the rm (and hence increasing in market share). Also note that the markup
elasticity for an average rm (with
σ
σ−1xi = 1) is given by Γ̄ =
ε
σ−1 , and is particularly sensitive to the
curvature of demand parameter ε (the elasticity of the elasticity). Lastly, the demand aggregator in (A15)



















Table A4: Quantitative model with Kimball demand: strategic complementarities and ERPT
Panel A: Price change regressions as in Table 7
Dep. var.: ∆pit All Small Large Interaction
∆mcit 0.618 0.704 — 0.704
∆mcit × Largeit — — 0.576 −0.128
∆p−it 0.289 0.237 — 0.238
∆p−it × Largeit — — 0.339 0.101
Panel B: ERPT decomposition as in Table 8
All Home Large Small Foreign
ϕ̄J 0.300 0.200 0.245 0.122 0.700
ΨJ 0.249 0.196 0.224 0.150 0.456




a−1e−tdt is the incomplete Gamma-function. With this, P and P/D are determined by
solving for the xed point in (A19).
We assume the same cost and productivity structure as in the Atkeson-Burstein simulation, and
in addition we choose the demand shifter ξi to be correlated with rm productivity in order to match
the fat-tailed sales distribution in the data.
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We target the same set of moments in the calibration.
In particular, we set σ = 5 and ε = 1.6 to match the variability of markups and the resulting own
cost pass-through and strategic complementarity elasticites. We report these results in the left panel
of Table A4, which parallels Table 7 in the text for the Atkeson-Burstein calibration. As discussed in
footnote 57, the Kimball model can reproduce the average pass-through and strategic complementarity
elasticities, but has a hard time simultaneously capturing the extent of heterogeneity across rms in
these elasticities and the fatness of the right tail of the sales distribution. Therefore, our calibration of
the Kimball model ends up understating the amount of heterogeneity in the strategic complementarities
across rms. Nonetheless, it captures the qualitative patterns of our estimates in Tables 1–2 of Section 3.
Finally, the right panel of Table A4 reports the results of the exchange rate depreciation counter-
factual in the calibrated Kimball model, as in Table 8 in the text for the Atkeson-Burstein calibration.
The two quantitative models agree on the patterns of price and markup adjustment in response to an
exchange rate depreciation: the average industry markup declines, small home rms increase markups,
while foreign and large home rms reduce their markups, and the markups of all home rms decline on
average. However, since the Kimball model does not capture the full extent of heterogeneity in markup
elasticities across rms, it produces somewhat more muted movements in aggregate and group-specic
markups. Overall, these results illustrate the robustness of the predicted patterns of markup adjustment
in response to exchange rate shocks across dierent models of variable markups, as long as the models
are disciplined by the same empirical patterns of markup variability documented in Section 3.
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Our empirical analysis emphasizes three key features of the data: (i) no strategic complementarities and complete pass-
through exhibited by the bulk of small rms; (ii) strong strategic complementarities and incomplete pass-through exhibited by
the largest rms; (iii) extremely fat-tailed distribution of rm sales (market shares), referred to as the Zipf’s law. We show that
the oligopolistic CES model is successful in capturing all of these facts, which at the same time proves to be challenging for
the monopolistic competition models with non-CES demand. First, capturing fact (i) requires that demand is asymptotically
constant elasticity (CES) as the price of the rm increases and the rm becomes small. Otherwise, the model would produce
counterfactual incomplete pass-through for the small rms. Second, jointly capturing facts (ii) and (iii) is another challenge.
While non-CES demand can easily produce signicant markup variability, resulting in incomplete pass-through and strategic
complementarities, this is achieved by means of a declining curvature in demand, resulting in increasing optimal markups
and prices, limiting optimal sales of the rm and hence curbing the fatness of the tail of the sales distribution. Avoiding this
requires the use of demand shifters ξi correlated with rm productivity.
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